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Abstract 
 
  The eighteenth-century English writer Malachy Postlethwayt (1707-1767) served as 
an advisor to multiple Prime Ministers and leading politicians. He also assisted the 
Royal African Company in its twilight years. During his political career he wrote 
several publications discussing topics that ranged from the slave trade to BritainÕs 
system of commerce. Despite this his publications on the political economy have been 
hitherto-unstudied. In this research his major publications; the Universal Dictionary of 
Trade and Commerce and BritainÕs Commercial Interest will be given their deserved 
attention, in addition to his other published pamphlets and private correspondence. 
These works will be analysed, evaluated and categorised under the new 
conceptualisation ÔMetropolismÕ. 
 
  ÔMetropolismÕ was an approach that went beyond economic concerns and was part 
of a wider strategic goal of empowering metropolitan traders and the British nation 
relative to its trade and military rivals. This idea will be articulated and detailed 
through a close examination of Malachy PostlethwaytÕs published works and 
supplementary historiographical details. 
 
It is then placed within the wider Ômercantilist historiographyÕ, which is argued to be 
faulty and lacking precision in its terms. The many problems existing within this 
Ômercantilist historiographyÕ, from its unstable foundation in the Wealth of Nations 
through to a core lack of unity between mercantilist writers, are addressed and framed 
with this reconstructed context of the wider ÔmercantilistÕ historiography and 
intellectual thought.  
  
 This article is 25,249 words long. 
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I 
Introduction 
 
 The histories of political and intellectual thought are lined with the memory of the 
prevalent thinkers; from Plato through to Confucius, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and 
Benjamin Franklin. It is rare for writers who were not celebrated by their 
contemporaries or by future generations to be studied by historians. This research will 
look to study one such forgotten writer Ð Malachy Postlethwayt (1707-1767), a 
political-economist and so-called Ôrigid mercantilistÕ and analyse his proposals for 
BritainÕs improvement.
1
 This analysis will be conceptualised as ÔMetropolismÕ and 
will be furnished with theory from the social sciences. As Mark Casson has stated,  
The application of entrepreneurship theory to history combines elements of 
both economics and sociology. It is difficult, for example, to consider the role 
of business partners and family owners without considering not only the 
economic opportunities they discover but also the webs of social obligations in 
which they are embedded.
2
 
This research will therefore incorporate entrepreneurship theory, network theory and 
studies on reputation and risk in order to better articulate and understand the 
structures of trade and power that Postlethwayt advocated for and to better place this 
research within current Atlantic history trends.
3
 
 
 The main research questions that guided this research were; what ideas did Malachy 
Postlethwayt present? Can these ideas be considered mercantilism? The remainder of 
the research questions are corollaries to these. Was he a reliable source of 
                                            
1
 E. Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (North Carolina, 1944), p. 18. 
2
 M. Casson, Entrepreneurship: Theory, Networks, History, (Cheltenham, 2010) p. 34. 
3
 For definition of ÔmetropolismÕ see pp. 9-10. 
 5 
information? How informed was he as a commentator on the political economy? 
Where do his ideas fit within the development of British political ideas? By answering 
these questions, this research should better allow Malachy PostlethwaytÕs work to be 
placed within the Atlantic historiography.  
 
  As a Ôpolitical-economistÕ, Malachy Postlethwayt has been mostly forgotten, 
referenced intermittently, usually as little more than a name-check.
4
 Some deride him 
as a Ôspin doctorÕ, but most just ignore him.
5
 Through the work of Peter Groenewegen 
and Robert Bennett his personal history has been well documented but not his 
political ideas. The following short biography will establish the vital context for this 
research, which focuses on his rarely-studied publications.  
 
 Malachy Postlethwayt was born in Stepney, London and was baptised at St. Dunstan 
on the 25th of May 1707.
6
 His father, John Postlethwayt was a victualler operating in 
the Limehouse region and worked for the VintnerÕs Company.
7
 Groenewegen has 
speculated that Malachy attended St. PaulÕs School in London, as his brother James 
had.
8
 This seems plausible because his uncle, Johns Postlethwayt, had been the High 
                                            
4
 Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, passim, is the main exception, though it concentrates on his 
advocacy for the slave trade, a minor facet of PostlethwaytÕs ideas. 
5
 R. J. Bennett, ÔMalachy Postlethwayt: Genealogy and Influence of an early economist and spin 
doctorÕ, GenealogistsÕ Magazine, 31 (June, 2011), p. 187. 
6
 Oxford Dictionary of National Biography: Malachy Postlethwayt: 
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/22599 Last Accessed 10/9/13; Family Search Archives: 
ÔEngland Births and Christenings, 1538-1975Õ: Malachi Postlethwart, 25 May 1707: 
https://familysearch.org/pal:/MM9.1.1/NPH1-7F7 Last Accessed: 13/9/13; N.B: There are some 
variations in the records as to the spelling of the ÔPostlethwaytÕ surname. This variation is used for 
clarity purposes and corresponds with the name that was written in most of his published works. 
7
 Bennett, ÔMalachy PostlethwaytÕ, p. 187. 
8
 OXDNB: Malachy Postlethwayt. 
 6 
Master of the school from 1697-1713, a family connection that may have ensured 
patronage of the school.
9
  
 
 PostlethwaytÕs early career was focused on political writing Ð he ÔapprenticedÕ with 
writer Charles Snell, joined the Society of Antiquaries then later became an advisor to 
Prime Minister Robert Walpole. From 1734 through to 1742 and the demise of 
WalpoleÕs ministry, he served the Prime Minister well as an able articulator on 
matters such as excise tax and the tobacco lobby.
10
 At this stage of his career, he 
concentrated on pamphlets and direct political attacks on behalf on Walpole. Theirs 
was a fruitful relationship, and the correspondence suggests a degree of familiarity - 
he was willing to push for his brotherÕs recommendation to be a secretary for the 
ambassador to Constantinople, Everard Fawkener.
11
 However with the departure of 
Robert Walpole from political office, Postlethwayt was never to reach such heights 
again. 
  
In 1743, after the fall of WalpoleÕs ministry, Postlethwayt went to work for the Royal 
African Company to arbitrate a Ôbilling disputeÕ, which he successfully performed and 
later Ôwas elected a member of the Court of AssistantsÕ. Due to the precipitous 
position the company was placed in, this never proved to be a reliable source of 
income for Postlethwayt and by 1747 he returned to pamphleteering for Prime 
                                            
9
 M. McDonnell, A History of St. PaulÕs School (1909), pp. 270-291; PROB 11/535/381: Johns 
Postlethwait/wayt. 
10
 Bennett, ÔMalachy PostlethwaytÕ, pp. 190-191. 
11
 Cholmondeley Ch(H), Correspondence 1, Cambridge University Library: 2459: Malachy 
Postlethwayt to Robert Walpole 4 Aug 1735. 
 7 
Minister Henry Pelham, likely through the contacts he had developed during his 
twelve-year service for Walpole.
12
 
 
 During the 1740s he attempted to invest in industry, first with a patent for Ôcasting 
iron similar to forged iron, using coal and saltsÕ, though this was unsuccessful.
13
 He 
also dabbled in smelting with Northern industrialists, which seems to have been even 
less successful, with Postlethwayt claiming to have been misled by Ôchemical 
jugglersÕ.
14
 This was then followed by an ÔacademyÕ in Hemel Hempstead where 
ÔgentlemenÕ were to be trained into ÔmerchantsÕ, which was also a failure.
15
  
 
Pamphleteering continued sporadically, firstly for Henry Pelham and then for the 
Marquis of Rockingham. PostlethwaytÕs employment with Pelham was ended 
abruptly due to difficulties arising with securing official documents for his ÔUniversal 
Dictionary of Trade and CommerceÕ. The Dictionary should have been his magnum 
opus, proved the final nail in his career. The printing of it was riven with difficulty as 
the printers fought over expenses and he later Ôwas forced to sell the copyrightÕ due to 
financial difficulties, meaning he received no revenue from the third edition 
onwards.
16
 
 
                                            
12
 Bennett, ÔMalachy PostlethwaytÕ, pp. 191-194; K. G. Davies, The Royal African Company (1970), 
passim, details the difficulties the company faces; for PostlethwaytÕs involvement with the Royal 
African Company see Chapter VII pp. 66-81. 
13
 Bennett, ÔMalachy PostlethwaytÕ, p. 192. 
14
 M. Postlethwayt, The Universal Dictionary of Trade and Commerce, Fourth Edition, Volume I 
(London, 1774), ÔchemistryÕ; P. A. Riden, A Gazetteer of Charcoal-fired Blast Furnaces in Great 
Britain in use since 1660 (Cardiff, 1993)pp. 112, 116, it is possible that he fostered connections in 
Northern industry through family networks. There is mention of a ÔMiles PostlethwaiteÕ who was 
involved with a Lancashire ironworks as well as a James Postlethwaite with a Cumberland ironworks. 
However there is no clear link, especially considering the variations in surname spelling. 
15
 M. Postlethwayt, The MerchantÕs Public Counting House (London, 1751), advertisement; Bennett, 
ÔMalachy PostlethwaytÕ, p. 193. 
16
 Bennett, ÔMalachy PostlethwaytÕ, pp. 190-194. 
 8 
 These financial difficulties were likely caused by his failure to find solid employment 
again, his failed investments and his struggle to secure payment for work.
17
 By March 
1761 PostlethwaytÕs financial position was so severe that he became a Ôprisoner in his 
majestyÕs prison of the fleetÕ.
18
 PostlethwaytÕs career never recovered from the 
reputational damage of this and he did not produce any further publications of any 
importance before dying ÔsuddenlyÕ in 1767.
19
 
 
Despite the decline and near irrelevance of his latter years, Postlethwayt was, for a 
time, an important and prominent political economist. He emerged at the latter end of 
the series of Ômercantilist political-economistsÕ that began approximately with the 
ideas of Ôthe Weal of the Common PeopleÕ and ended with the works of Adam Smith 
gained popularity and the rise of the Ôsecond British EmpireÕ.
20
 Despite being 
overshadowed by the Wealth of Nations, his work warrants more attention than it has 
received, considering that he served as an advisor to two prime ministers, MPs and 
the Royal African Company. This research will look to correct this imbalance by 
performing a close cross-examination of Malachy PostlethwaytÕs publications, letters 
and pamphlets. Through this analysis, a conceptualisation of PostlethwaytÕs ideas, 
labelled ÔMetropolismÕ will be introduced and explored with the assistance of social 
sciences theory. This conceptualisation will enable PostlethwaytÕs work to be better 
                                            
17
 Bennett, ÔMalachy PostlethwaytÕ, pp. 190-194. 
18
 London Gazette: Issue 10090, 24th March 1761, p. 8; Issue 10091, 28th March 1761, p. 6; this was 
likely due to insolvency rather than bankruptcy, see: S. Marriner, ÔBankruptcy records and statistics 
before 1850Õ, The Economic History Review 33:3 (1980) pp. 851-866, for more information of 
bankruptcy vs. insolvency, S. Haggerty, The British-Atlantic Trading Community 1760-1810: Men, 
Women and the Distribution of Goods(Leiden, 2006), pp. 173-181. 
19
 Bennett, ÔMalachy PostlethwaytÕ, p. 194. 
20
 E. Lamond(ed.), A Discourse of the Common Weal of this Realm of England: First printed in 1581 
and commonly attributed to W. S. (Cambridge, 1893), passim; The concept of a Ôsecond British 
EmpireÕ is under dispute and this research makes no pretense of answering it, however there was a 
distinct shift in ideas of empire that emerged in the mid-to-late eighteenth century; C. A. Bayly, ÔThe 
Second British EmpireÕ, in R. W. Winks(ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire, Volume V: 
Historiography (Oxford, 2007), pp. 54-72, summarises the historiography discussing these changes. 
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placed within the mercantilist historiography.
21
 Other contemporary intellectual 
sources, including Adam Smith and Gerard de Malynes will be incorporated into this 
analysis with supporting primary evidence from parliamentary papers of legal acts 
that assist in understanding PostlethwaytÕs writing.  
 
 Central to this thesis is the concept ÔMetropolismÕ. Metropolism is a policy thatÕs 
primary goal is the empowerment of Britain Ð the metropole - over rival states and its 
colonies. Though power-focused, it was not inherently violent: supremacy was 
achieved through attaining Ôthe advantage in the Ballance[sic] of TradeÕ by exporting 
Ômore of the native commodities and imports[ing] less of foreignÕ.
22
 The combination 
of raw material imports, domestic manufacturing and aggressive exporting would 
contribute to BritainÕs primacy on the world stage. This positive balance of trade was 
assisted by a ÔsubservientÕ colonial structure whose regulation and governance would 
be better adapted to fit with the realities and pressures of the changing world.
23
 This 
balance of trade therefore provides domestic employment and a greater access to raw 
materials and luxuries for its people. This structure was intended to ensure domestic 
self-sufficiency, prosperity and security. Colonies were viewed primarily as a means 
of supplying raw materials for the metropole and to a lesser extent, exclusive markets 
for British exports. Slaves were not racially denigrated under this system but did 
function in purely economic terms as a means of extracting these exotic colonial raw 
materials.
24
 
 
 While Metropolism did endorse and implement protectionist measures through 
                                            
21
 See Chapter II, pp. 11-23. 
22
 Postlethwayt, The Universal Dictionary, Volume I, Ôballance of tradeÕ. 
23
 M. Postlethwayt, BritainÕs Commercial Interest: Volume I (London, 1757), pp. 150-154. 
24
 See Chapter VII, pp.66-82. 
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colonial trade networks and legislation, there was not an opposition to competition. 
Competition within these frameworks - the Ôrivalship of cultivatorsÕ - was encouraged 
in order to reduce prices, improving their international competitiveness and allowing 
for Ôsuperiority in that branch of tradeÕ.
25
 Though this could be tempered when 
internal competition reduced British competitiveness.
26
 At its core, this strategy was 
driven by an evidence-based approach to formulating policy. It was not idealistic; it 
focused on practical solutions driven by experience and evidence, suiting 
PostlethwaytÕs role as a political advisor. Such pragmatic solutions included a desire 
for more realistic and wider tax base, innovative approaches to government debt and 
the closer integration of Ireland with the metropole.
27
 
 Metropolism will be detailed further throughout this research, beginning with an 
exploration of the mercantilist historiography into which it fits in Chapter II: 
ÔMercantilism, Political Economy and MetropolismÕ. 
 
  
                                            
25
 Postlethwayt, BritainÕs Commercial Interest: Volume I, pp. 159-162. 
26
 M. Postlethwayt, BritainÕs Commercial Interest: Volume II (London, 1757), pp. 153-155; see pp. 43-
58 for more details foreign trade monopolies. 
27
 See pp. 40-42, for his approach to taxation; pp. 61-65, for the national debt; pp. 71-73, for integration 
with Ireland. 
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II  
Context:  Mercantilism, Political Economy and Metropolism 
 
 Before assessing PostlethwaytÕs publications, it is necessary to define the terms of 
the discussion and establish the contexts for his work. This chapter will explore the 
main proponents of mercantile thought and the historiography of mercantilism in 
order to demonstrate where Metropolism fits as a sub-genre within it. 
 
 The fundamentals of a Ôfully-fledged mercantilist doctrineÕ  - the pursuit of a 
Ôfavourable balance of trade and Ôarguments for protectionismÕ - can be traced to the 
works of Sir Thomas Smith as early as the sixteenth-century.
28
 It did not carry the 
label ÔmercantilismÕ but shares a clear heritage. Foreign trade is emphasised: Ôno 
countrie shoulde have all commodities; but that, that one lacketh, an other bringeth 
forthÕ [sic].
29
 However this overseas trade should be carefully monitored to ensure 
that Ôwe bie no more of strangers then we sell them, for so wee sholde empouerishe 
owr selves and enriche themeÕ [sic], in other words, ensuring a positive balance of 
trade.
30
 This was encouraged because it was seen as promoting British strength 
relative to other powers and because the domestic manufacture of materials that arose 
from it supported domestic employment.
31
 The ÔCommon WealÕ established these 
main tenets - trade advocacy and protectionism to ensure a positive balance of trade 
and a support for domestic employment - which persist throughout the literature for 
                                            
28
 J. Hoppit, ÔThe Context and Contours of British Economic LiteratureÕ, Historical Journal, 49 (2006), 
pp. 79-80; L. Magnusson, ÔEconomics and the Public Interest: The Emergence of Economics as an 
Academic Subject during the 18th CenturyÕ, The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 94 (1992), p. 
251; Lamond, A Discourse of the Common Weal, p. 61 
29
 Lamond, A Discourse of the Common Weal, p. 61. 
30
 Lamond, A Discourse of the Common Weal, p. 63. 
31
 D. Irwin, Against the Tide; an Intellectual History of Free Trade (Princeton, 1996), p. 28. 
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many years.
32
 It is perhaps its vague nature that made it so long lasting, but 
nevertheless these are the basic terms for mercantilism. 
From here the divisions within mercantilism began to emerge. Until the 1620s, Gerard 
de MalynesÕ ideas were most prominent. He emphasised the absolute importance of 
accumulating billion through foreign trade: 
 
no man shall make any exchangesÉ for moneys to be paeid in forreine pars, 
or to be rechanged towards this realme under the true par or value for value of 
our moneyesÕ with this acceptable rate Ôdeclared by a paire of Tables upon the 
Royall Exchange.
33
 
 This desire to ensure a positive balance of trade  to ensure that bullion is imported, 
was intended by de Malynes to be regulated on a merchant-by-merchant basis.
34
 He 
was at the centre of intellectual debate in the early seventeenth century, most 
famously of all with Thomas Mun who argued that de MalynesÕ emphasis on the Ôrate 
of exchangeÕ was only a ÔsymptomÕ of a wider ÔimbalanceÕ in foreign trade.
35
 MunÕs 
prognosis deemphasised the accumulation of bullion in favour of a national-level 
positive balance of trade - the beginning of what Jacob Viner has called ÔmercantilistÕ 
ideas.
36
 This growing recognition of an Ôeconomics of abundanceÕ that was Ônot a 
                                            
32
 It should be noted that the extent of its influence is unclear; it was however a very early exponent of 
these ideas. 
33
 G. Malynes, The Centre of the Circle of Commerce (1623) ed. A. M. Kelley (Clifton, 1973), p. 121. 
34
 Malynes, The Centre, passim; E. A. J. Johnson, ÔGerard De Malynes and the Theory of the Foreign 
ExchangeÕ, American Economic Review, 23/3 (Sept. 1933), passim, has questioned the overemphasis 
on MalynesÕ monetary approach but as a general rule this is a fair reading of his publications. 
35
 OXDNB: Gerard de Malynes. 
36
 J. Viner, Studies in the Theory of International Trade (New York, 1937), pp. 1.4-1.6; Viner identifies 
a split between a ÔbullionistÕ faction and the prevailing ÔmercantilistÕ faction, with Mun and de 
Malynes as the prominent figureheads for the respective factions. 
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zero-sum gameÕ has been connected to Commonwealth-era intellectual thought.
37
 The 
identification of divergence within the mercantilist literature is excellent and much 
needed, as will be explored later.
38
 Despite these differences, Mun and de Malynes 
operated from the same basic framework: trade as a means of national empowerment, 
supported through regulation to achieve a positive balance of trade. They also shared 
a loose belief in the anachronistic Ôfixed cake of tradeÕ, which by the time of Colbert 
was Ôrecognised mercantilist doctrineÕ.
39
 Their division was between how success was 
measured and the specific implementation of regulations.
40
 This is important because 
these ideas remained prominent in some form until the works of Adam Smith became 
popular. 
 This image of mercantilism as a practice with established fundamentals as opposed to 
an ideology runs contrary to much of the historiography. Adam Smith was the 
progenitor for mercantilism as a historiographical concept, with the Wealth of Nations 
laying the groundwork for the criticism of it for decades to come. Therefore a brief 
summary of SmithÕs perception of mercantilism will be presented here, followed by 
an exploration of the further historiographical developments on the subject.
41
 
 
 Smith was cynical of the intentions of merchants, a group widely celebrated by the 
mercantilists, claiming that they Ôknew perfectly in what manner it[trade] enriched 
                                            
37
 S. Pincus, ÔNeither Machiavellian Moment nor Possessive Individualism: Commercial Society and 
the Defenders of the English CommonwealthÕ, The American Historical Review, 103/3 (Jun., 1998), 
pp. 720-721. 
38
 Viner, Studies in the Theory, pp. 1.4-1.6; ÔBullionistÕ is a precise and useful term but ÔmercantilistÕ 
not so. A better term is needed for an otherwise solid concept. 
39
 D. Coleman, ÔMercantilism RevisitedÕ, Historical Journal, 23/4 (1980), pp. 783-786, this was 
anachronistic due to it emerging after Ôa century or so of overseas commercial expansionÕ; OXDNB: 
Gerard de Malynes; E. Heckscher, Mercantilism: Volume II, revised edition, ed. E. F. Sderlund 
(London, 1955), pp. 20-27. 
40
 Viner, Studies in the Theory, pp. 1.4-1.6. 
41
 G. Kennedy, Great Thinkers in Economics: Adam Smith (Basingstoke, 2008), pp. 188-191, 
summarises SmithÕs criticisms on mercantilism. 
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themselvesÕ, but gave no thought to how Ôit enriched the countryÕ. Consequently the 
Ôsubject never came into their consideration but when they had occasion to apply to 
their country for some change in the laws relating to foreign tradeÕ.
 
Smith was 
simultaneously cynical of the efficacy of governments, so willing to accede to the 
demands of insistent merchants and implement tariffs or protectionism. Smith felt that 
such ÔprohibitionsÕ could be of clear benefit to the targeted industries, but did not 
contribute to Ôthe general industry of the society or to give it the most advantageous 
directionÕ.
42
 
 
 One such monopoly Smith criticised was in the wool trade. The Ôabsolute prohibition 
of importing woollen clothsÕ and the restrictions on Ôthe exportation of live sheep and 
woolÕ Ð were seen as absurd in their specificity.
43
 He identified the motives Ð it 
Ôtotally preventedÕ the export of BritainÕs wool, seen as Ôsuperior to that of any other 
countryÕ; manipulating the market to allow for the control of prices, thereby securing 
an Ôadvantageous balance of tradeÕ.
44
 SmithÕs problem with this practice is not just the 
national economic disadvantages but the moral difficulty which this market distortion 
and preferential treatment caused by subverting the Ôjustice and equality of treatment 
which the sovereign owes to all the different orders of his subjectsÕ.
45
 Mercantilism 
did attempt to control and distort markets. One example of this is the 1660 Navigation 
ActÕs declaration that Ônoe Goods or Commodityes whatsoever of the growth 
production or manufacture of Africa, Asia or America or any part thereofÉ be 
imported into EnglandÕ or the 1696 extension of the Act that placed importance on 
                                            
42
 A, Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776), IV. 
43
 Smith, Wealth of Nations, IV, VII. 
44
 Smith, Wealth of Nations, IV, VIII; see Chapter III, pp. 23-32, for discussion on the balance of trade. 
45
 Smith, Wealth of Nations, IV, VIII. 
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English identity.
46
 These were to Smith both unethical and uneconomic, driving a 
painful cycle of Ôillegal exportationÕ, which would necessitate increasingly 
ÔburdensomeÕ taxes to cover the loss of tax revenue.
47
  
 Adam Smith shared the mercantilistsÕ fascination with colonies. He claimed that the 
process of colonisation delivered a Ôknowledge of agriculture and of other useful arts, 
superior to what can grow up of its own accord, in the course of many centuries, 
among savage and barbarous nationsÕ as well as bringing Ôthe habit of subordination, 
some notion of the regular government which takes place in their own country, of the 
system of laws which support it, and of a regular administration of justiceÕ.
48
 Though 
such words would not be out of place from a mercantilist writer, it is perhaps 
reflective of SmithÕs moral-philosophy approach because he also recognises that the 
tax revenue in the colonies Ôhave seldom been equal to the expense laid out upon 
them in time of peaceÕ as well as being a military ÔdistractionÕ.
49
 The Ôexclusive trade 
of the mother countriesÕ for a colonyÕs unique goods which mercantilism established, 
served only to ÔdiminishÕ their value relative to what could be achieved if they were  
made available to a wider market under Ôfree tradeÕ.
50
 Evidently, monocultural 
colonies such as Demerara Ð by design, able to provide an exclusive trade in line with 
mercantilist ideas Ð did not fulfil the human-development faculty that a colony could 
perform, while also hindering free trade.
51
 
 Adam Smith was particularly critical of the mercantilist obsession with bullion, 
                                            
46
 History Central.com: http://www.historycentral.com/documents/Navigation.html Navigation Act 
1660, Last accessed: 1/9/13; History Central.com: 
http://www.historycentral.com/documents/NAVIGATIONACT1696.html, Navigation Act 1696, Last 
accessed: 1/9/13; see pp. 37-38 for an example of Postlethwayt advocating for similar restrictions. 
47
 Smith, Wealth of Nations, IV, VIII. 
48
 Smith, Wealth of Nations, IV, VII, II. 
49
 Smith, Wealth of Nations, IV, VII, III. 
50
 Smith, Wealth of Nations, IV, VII, III; see pp. 47-51 for PostlethwaytÕs attitude on liberty. 
51
 J. H. Andrews, ÔAnglo-American Trade in the Early Eighteenth CenturyÕ, Geographical Review, 
45/1 (Jan., 1955), pp. 99-110. 
 16 
arguing that it Ôis but a very small part of the annual produce of the land and labour of 
a countryÕ and that the Ôgreater part is circulated and consumed amongst themselvesÕ. 
Even the surplus, is Ôgenerally destined for the purchase of other foreign goodsÕ. 
Thus, ÔmoneyÉ necessarily runs after goods, but goods do not always or necessarily 
run after moneyÕ - moneyÕs value rides not in itself but in that which it can be 
exchanged for. In other words - bullion accumulation offered little value by itself. The 
accumulation of bullion was not even the ÔprincipalÕ benefit of foreign trade: it 
enables returns on goods that would otherwise have exceeded domestic demand, and 
these returns could come in foreign goods that were in high demand domestically. It 
could trade something that is unnecessary for something desirable. Smith evidenced 
this with the example of ÔhardwareÕ, a non-perishable commodity like bullion, and 
showed that these products are naturally ÔregulatedÕ by the consumer need for such 
items. Bullion faced a similar natural regulation - if it was allowed Ôto be accumulated 
beyondÕ the required amount (a flexible and changing amount) then Ôno law could 
prevent their being sent out of the countryÕ.
52
  
The major relevant points from SmithÕs work have been detailed here. More thorough 
analysis is beyond the remit of this research.
53
 The key issue with SmithÕs 
interpretation of mercantilism is that it was conceived in pejorative terms, shaped by 
his opposition to monopolistic practices and desire for a more free trade.
54
 Smith 
writes of a need for Ôthe perfect freedomÕ and implies that the mercantilists were 
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restricting this.
55
 In fact, the mercantilists saw themselves as enabling liberty - Eli 
Heckscher claimed that, Ôon principle, mercantilist authors and statesmen not only 
believed in but actually emphasised ÒfreedomÓ, especially Òfreedom of tradeÓÕ.
56
 
Postlethwayt himself used such language at times, calling himself Ôa friendÉ to the 
free liberty of trade and an enemy to monopolies in generalÕ.
57
 
 Despite the implications of SmithÕs work, he does mostly focus on the problems with 
monopolies - he aimed to Ôslay Ôthe mercantilist dragon of monopoly privileges and 
special interestsÕ.
58
 Most of it was sensible and descriptive but it was also dated, 
presenting mercantilism as following the ÔbullionistÕ interpretation when its 
relationship with bullion had become looser and more flexible.
59
 It also suffers from 
an assumption of unity amongst mercantile thought - defining exactly what this is 
with little nuance.
60
 In fact there was ÔÔlittle cohesion among mercantilist writersÉ no 
commonly accepted body of ideasÕ and Ôcommunication between mercantilistsÉ was 
poor or non-existentÕ.
61
 However the main problem with the historiography on 
mercantilism is the widespread misinterpretation of Smith. Though his depiction of 
mercantilism is not flawless, his main focus was upon the Ôconsequences of the 
deplorable behaviour of legislatorsÕ and his Ôproper agendaÕ was far less focused on 
Ôlaissez-faire policyÕ, which would ÔsurpriseÕ many.
62
 Many classical economists and 
economic historians of Smith adopted and misused this interpretation of 
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mercantilism.
63
  
 Following the Wealth of Nations a number of historians and critics attempted to 
explore what constituted mercantilism. Eli HeckscherÕs two-volume treatise of the 
subject was the most complex, offering the broadest periodization and the most 
complicated terms. He built upon the early historiography by attributing to it Ôa desire 
for unification, the pursuit of powerÉ protectionism and a monetary theory linked 
with the balance of tradeÕ but then added his unique fifth element: a Ôconception of 
societyÕ.
64
 This is where Heckscher contravened the norms established by Smith as he 
saw the mercantilist writers and statesman as motivated by a Hobbesian or 
Benthamite sense of Ônatural lawÕ, motivating their belief in concepts of ÔfreedomÕ 
and liberty in trade.
65
 As already established this places the mercantilists and Adam 
Smith as utilising the same concept of ÔfreedomÕ, but the difference between the two - 
likely driven by their differing occupations - meant that Smith provided a 
ÔhumanitarianÕ viewpoint while the mercantilists perceived Ôthe desired resultsÕ as 
being Ôaffected Ôby the dextrous management of a skilful politicianÕ.
66
 
This active meddling by politicians and the desire for power on a national level are 
also integral to CunninghamÕs interpretation of mercantilism. For him, the opening of 
the ÔNew WorldÕ brought into focus the strength of rival nations and with this 
awareness came a desire to protect and to usurp. A Ôkeen national feelingÉ was thus 
evokedÕ, driving politicians to act with Ôno scruple[s] in trampling on private interests 
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of every kindÕ in order to better manage the nationÕs power.
67
 There was a simple 
formula - ÔPower depends onÉ the accumulation of treasureÉ the development of 
shippingÉ and the maintenance of an effective PopulationÕ.
68
 Cunningham went into 
further detail, but presented a simple set of ideas, which is appealing when trying to 
provide a general definition of the term mercantilism. However it is also problematic: 
the desire for power is not a defining motive, the absence of it could be, but not in of 
itself. Also while the desire by mercantilists to regulate is undeniable, as evidenced by 
reams of legislation and almost every historian, critic and supporter, to call it 
ÔtramplingÕ seems extreme and ideological.
69
 CunninghamÕs view here is dated, 
failing to account for the mercantilistsÕ desire for freedom but nuanced acceptance of 
some necessary regulation within.
70
 This rapacity in their regulation is not reflected in 
the facts. There was a notable heightening of regulation at various points and 
politicians did effectively create monopolies in certain markets, but there were also 
many occasions where they were lax or casual in use.
71
 Many of American colonies 
avoided and grew accustomed to the early regulation, which was only interfered with 
in their final years under British control.
72
 Similarly colonial governors could escape 
regulation enforcement with little recourse.
73
 There was interference with private 
interests, but no concerted or effective effort to trample.   
Gustav Schmoller agreed with Cunningham on the motives of mercantilism: he saw 
them as a means to achieving unity, in accordance with the Ôcommon interestsÕ of a 
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nation in changing, increasingly global world. It was both Ôstate-making and national-
economy making at the same timeÕ, but the primacy is placed on achieving political 
unity and by extension, power.
74
  
 This contributed to an early historiographical dispute over whether ÔpowerÕ or 
ÔplentyÕ was the objective of mercantilism. However, modern historians have 
debunked much of this argument. To them it is a misnomer to see power and plenty as 
separate objectives Ð rather the two are reciprocal Ð plenty brings power and vice 
versa.
75
 Heckscher too saw them as two key parts of the mercantilist objectives.
76
 It 
does demonstrate fundamental differences Ð SchmollerÕs focus was on Frederick the 
GreatÕs Prussia, whose political and economic situation was vastly different to that of 
Britain, the Dutch or France.
77
 Others focused on Colbertism, ÔstaatsmerkantilismusÕ, 
ÔpureÕ mercantilism while a few concentrated on a pan-European concept.
78
  
 The nature of the material itself is frequently questioned, too. The cynicism that 
Cunningham brought to the debate was continued in VinerÕs work, claiming that Ôthe 
great bulk of the mercantilist literature consisted of tracts which were partly or 
wholly, frankly or disguisedly, special pleas for special economic interestsÕ.
79
 In the 
case of Postlethwayt, this seems to be partially applicable at least, with his publication 
of three separate pleas regarding the slave trade.
80
 Viner even goes so far as to say 
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that some of these writers Ôgrossly misunderstood the true means to and nature of 
plentyÕ.
81
 However this does not necessarily demean the concept of mercantilism: it 
had a generally recognisable set of fundamentals - it criticised the writers of this 
literature, who were not necessarily the practitioners of mercantilism, but the 
mouthpiece. 
It is important to note the pitfalls that Smith introduced and to remember that 
mercantilism is less idealistic and more about the practice of government. It is in this 
regard that DobbÕs interpretation comes closest. He labelled mercantilism as a policy 
of Ôprimitive accumulationÕ and a Ôsystem of state-regulated exploitation through 
tradeÕ.
82
 As a Marxist historian, Dobb was naturally critical of the proto-capitalistic 
systems that have been called mercantilism, but the raw simplicity of the viewpoint 
appears more apt for a basic definition of the term.
83
 Ironically this interpretation 
comes closest to SmithÕs work as both criticise the statist abuse of power through 
monopoly and cronyism, albeit for differing ends. 
 This is a necessarily brief summary of the mercantilist historiography demonstrating 
the main writers, points of dispute and agreement. Some positive steps have been 
made with the introduction of sub-genres that enable a more precise definition, but 
not enough. Much of the historiography is still rooted in decades-old literature. While 
there is a broad, intuitive sense of what mercantilism constitutes, there is 
disagreement over whether it is ideology or practice, whether it seeks power or plenty 
and it draws upon the critical work of Smith and the as widespread misinterpretation 
of SmithÕs work. This is fitting, for mercantilism had no Ôliving doctrine at allÕ, Ôit 
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never had a creedÕ and there was little communication between mercantilist writers.
84
 
Julian HoppitÕs recent analysis corroborates this; indicating that the pre-1760 
economic literature was Ôfrequently particular, political and polemicalÉoften 
nameless, halting and somewhat confusedÕ.
85
 It is little surprise therefore that the 
historiography is similarly confused. To this end, it is necessary to return to the 
original concept of mercantilism, via the political writers of its time to get a more 
accurate representation of the concept. In this paper, Malachy PostlethwaytÕs ideas 
will be explored and conceptualised as  ÔmetropolismÕ; a sub-genre within 
mercantilism.  
 The underlying philosophies and approaches endorsed by Metropolism will now be 
explored in chapter III, ÔThe Intellectual Fundamentals of MetropolismÕ. 
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III 
 The Intellectual Fundamentals of Metropolism 
Trade is at the centre of Metropolism and should be regarded as the ÔsoulÕ of its Ôbody 
politicÕ.
86
 Being born into a Britain that had expanded and explored areas of the world 
beyond their imagination, constructing trade networks and colonies as they went, the 
primacy of international trade in Malachy PostlethwaytÕs work is unsurprising.
87
 The 
ÔCommercial InterestÕ was the driving force of metropolism: the collective economic 
benefits of a successful international trade structure. This idea of ÔinterestÕ, be it of the 
Ôgeneral interestÕ or of the individual Ôtrading interestÕ, permeates throughout as a 
motive for action.
88
 These overlapping interests were central to the development of 
political thought decades prior to Postlethwayt. The Duke of RohanÕs ideas (adopted 
later by Marchamont Nedham) became common in political and economic circles 
during the mid-seventeenth century: the pursuit of Ôrational self-interestÔ by a nationÕs 
interest groups as a means of national improvement.
89
 Joyce Appleby claims that 
seventeenth-century England saw the rise of Ôthe economically rational personÉ who 
subverted all other drives to the economic one of gaining more power in the marketÕ 
and harnessing these individuals was key to the pursuit of success for England.
90
  
Thus, interest became part of the language of politics and Postlethwayt continued this 
tradition.  
The consequences of this interest go far beyond material concerns, as Postlethwayt 
asked: 
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the aborigines of America, how miserably wretched are they, in comparison to 
the Commercial Europeans? Was it not for the perpetual exercise of the 
European arts, ingenuity, industry and trade amongst them, what chance 
would they ever have stood to become humanised?
91
 
It also reflected a popular viewpoint at the time centred on the ideas of John Locke 
and other liberal commentators.  Uday Mehta has identified the liberal Òurge to 
dominate the worldÓ and liberalismÕs Òself-consciously universalÓ identity Òas a 
political, ethical and epistemological creedÓ.
92
 However, Armitage is critical of the 
role of liberalism in the mid-eighteenth century, claiming that as a result of particular 
debates the British EmpireÕs self-perception was ÒProtestant, commercial, maritime 
and freeÓ; pointedly not liberal.
93
  As the newly united three kingdoms of the British 
Isles confronted the realities of the Ôexpanding tradeÕ and their Ôtransatlantic 
coloniesÕ, the Ôpolitical economyÕ came into being as both a Ôtechnical language of 
administrationÕ and as a means of articulating ÔÔpolitical and constitutionalÕ 
arguments through which a Ônew form of polity in which colonies and metropole were 
linked by a common set of interestsÕ.
94
 This is a more appropriate suggestion for 
Postlethwayt, who wrote of the Ônatural rightÕ of Britain Ôto regulate the trade and 
navigation of their distant coloniesÕ; using Lockean concepts of a natural law as the 
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basis for his idealised system of trade.
95
 In addition to regulating, it was also the duty 
and right of a government to negotiate optimal trade agreements with Òforeign 
nationsÓ - an obvious statement but indicative of how there was an established 
awareness of international trade networks of competition and interaction.
96
 The 
ultimate objective of these policies is to achieve a domestic and international set of 
conditions that are Ômost conducive to the general interest of their mother countriesÕ.
97
 
Again, Postlethwayt references the concept of interest, but the most important element 
here is the delineation that the improvement of the Ômother country [sic]Õ, in other 
words the metropole - Britain, should be the primary objective.
98
 Different to 
nineteenth century writers, the focus is more domestic and less imperial. 
 There are three core principles that are demonstrated by the Ôhistory and nature of 
commerceÕ. Firstly, those people who are left ÔwantingÕ in Ônatural richesÕ 
compensate for this innate shortage Ôby dint of industryÕ: manufacturing the Ônatural 
riches of anotherÕ state and selling it to those who Ôstood in needÕ, in exchange for 
Ôgold and silver, which are what men have agreed to call richesÕ. This is the natural 
state of human behaviour - necessity drives efficiency and enterprise. Secondly, Ôthe 
greatest industry has ever been the effect of the greatest necessityÕ and any attempt to 
inhibit a nationÕs own trade or to Ônot carry on so great at trade as it is able to doÕ will 
be destructive as it can allow other ÔnationÕs to supply their wants themselvesÕ. This 
aggressive drive for trade therefore has both foreign advantages and domestic 
advantages because thirdly, Ôa country in which a great trade flourishesÉ will always 
be the most populousÕ. This is because Ôthe conveniences of life are what most attract 
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mankindÕ, as an example Ôtrading people surrounded by others not tradesÉ will very 
soon bring over to them as many of the latter as can reap a profit by being employed 
in their tradeÕ.
99
 The wide reaching networks of many early-modern merchants across 
British territory are testament to a certain validity to this argument, though there are 
several reasons as to how people were drawn into such networks.
100
 At its basis 
ÔcommerceÕ and by extension, Metropolism is designed Ôby labour to maintain in ease 
and plenty as many men as possibleÕ.
101
 
 In addition to these core principles, there are also Ônine maximsÕ under which Ôthe 
general operation of commerceÕ should operate. ÔSuperfluitiesÕ are the Ôclearest profit 
a nation can makeÕ and the best manner in which they should be exported is having 
been domestically Ôworked up or manufacturedÕ. It is typically preferable to import 
materials ÔunwroughtÔ and Ôexchange of merchandise for merchandiseÔ is acceptable 
except when it conflicts with the preceding maxims. Imported foreign goods that 
impede Ôthe consumption of national commoditiesÕ or harm Ôthe nationÕs 
manufacturesÕ should absolutely be avoided and similarly imported foreign luxury 
goods that were purchased Ôin exchange for moneyÕ provide a Ôreal loss to the stateÕ. 
By contrast the import of goods that Ôare absolutely necessaryÕ is not Ôan evilÕ but the 
state still loses out, but if goods are imported for the purpose of re-exportation, a Ôreal 
profitÕ can be made. Lastly, hiring out ships Ôfor freightÕ can be profitable. These 
ideas reflect a simple, basic understanding from which metropolism operates.
102
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 These interpretations of the nature of commerce speak more to the general consensus 
of mercantilist trade and largely constitute the basis of a nationÕs balance of trade. The 
way in which the metropole could be improved and empowered was through the 
application of balance and trade theory to the nationÕs economy. Postlethwayt 
believed that ÒThe Nation has the advantage in the Ballance [sic] of Trade, that 
exports more of the native commodities and imports less of foreignÓ; that exports 
must outweigh imports, thereby enabling a degree of international self-sufficiency and 
encouraging dependency from others to the metropole.
103
 Given the lack of 
sophistication in measuring technology, getting precise data for this would be 
difficult, prompting Postlethwayt to suggest that Òthe only rule whereby we can make 
a judgement of the ballance of general trade seems to be from the course of exchange 
and the price of bullionÓ.
104
 
This appears to connect Postlethwayt with the dated bullionist faction, alongside the 
likes of Gerard de Malynes who called for a similar focus on the exchange of 
bullion.
105
 However, Postlethwayt shows a lot more nuance and was willing to accept 
that a merchant selling British manufactures to foreign markets Ômay lose by the sale 
of themÕ on an individual level but the metropole will gain by Ôso much as they are 
sold forÕ because this money funded ÒlandÉ first materials, the wages of the 
workmen employed in manufacturing themÉ the navigationÉ the benefit of 
circulation and the tribute which the public wealth owes to the stateÕ.
106
 This shows 
Postlethwayt adapting to changes in the wider structure of the British economy - 
various factors including the decline of ÔEnglandÕs woollen industryÕ had prompted a 
shift in the economic literature from laissez-faire ÔindividualismÕ through to more 
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protectionist plans on a ÔnationalÕ level.
107
 Indeed he even cites Thomas Mun, 
claiming that the bullion trade was Ômost generally misunderstoodÕ and that the true 
benefits of bullion come from the Ôindustry and skill to improve tradeÕ.
108
 In essence, 
the amount of bullion in a country (besides natural, mineable gold and silver) reflects 
its skill in utilising and maximising its trade: it is a measure of relative success, not in 
itself beneficial - hoarding it for its own sake only created an Ôobstruction to... 
commercial societyÕ as evidenced by early Spanish prohibitions.
109
 If Appleby is to be 
believed it also indicates that - in this respect at least - Postlethwayt was in line with 
the general consensus and did not have a radical position. This was a national policy 
that would achieve Ôthe real riches of a stateÕ which is  Ôits superior degree of 
independence on other states for necessaries and the greater quantity of superfluities it 
has to exportÕ.
110
 This clearly identifies Postlethwayt as a ÔmercantilistÕ rather than a 
bullionist.
111
 It also shows the lack of care or understanding that he has for the 
workings of individual merchants; not only are their particular successes or failures of 
little concern to the overall focus of metropolism (which seems reasonable and 
realistic), but as will be shown through the rest of this work, he has little idea as to the 
way in which merchants operated. 
Part of the justification for achieving a positive balance of trade in the mercantilist 
literature was that there was a Ôfixed cake of tradeÕ in the world.
112
 This seems absurd 
given the overall economic growth witnessed since the seventeenth century. Irwin 
however has seen that technological and military concerns could make this more valid 
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a concern - Ôtrade was set along certain "channels" that could not accommodate more 
trafficÕ meaning that entry was possible only by displacing existing merchantsÕ.
113
 
This ignores the potential growth that could and did arise from new markets or new 
manufactured goods, for which there are innumerable examples in this period, from 
coffee to palm oil. 
 It is unclear whether Postlethwayt himself adopted this belief in a fixed overall 
volume of trade. He does encourage the enticement of skilled workers from European 
rivals, claiming that Ôthe division of Europe into several sovereignties, has left policy 
no other resource whereby to obtain superiorityÓ, implying a limited worldwide 
scope, but it could also just be exclusively talking about labour markets, which are 
inherently slow to change.
114
 However at the basis of his Ôprinciple of commerceÕ is 
the necessity of persistent growth in trade, which due to physical and natural 
limitations on raw materials and markets cannot be logically consistent with fixity of 
trade.
115
 This is because Metropolism offers a complex, nuanced interpretation of the 
concept. Postlethwayt is critical of the calculation of balance of trade for failing to 
adequately incorporate the importance of Ôthe number of hands [that] are employedÕ 
domestically and because value cannot be measured solely in economic terms: Ôthe 
balance of trade with a countryÕ can be negative but can Ôcompensate for that lossÕ by 
virtue of being Ôthe cause and necessary means of another tradeÕ.
116
 Thus, 
Metropolism distinguishes between the ÔparticularÕ balance of trade, being Ôthe trade 
between two statesÕ with all the accompanying treaties, and the ÔgeneralÕ balance of 
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trade, which, compiles all of these particulars.
117
 Because Ôstates balance with each 
other just as private men doÕ, this idea accommodates for population and trade 
volume growth, meaning that he did not believe in fixity of trade.
118
  This separates 
Metropolism from other mercantilist ideas, which were conceived in a period of 
stagnation, and represents a significant development towards the sort of concepts 
Adam Smith later proposed.
119
 
 It is also important to consider the audience for the work. As well as working for 
various politicians, the intended audience for most of his publications was politicians 
or the business elite.
120
 Irrespective of beliefs - which are often difficult to prove or 
define - it is important to remember that these texts (The Universal Dictionary 
excluded) are persuasive in nature and it may be that arguing to take from rivals in 
existing markets is simply a more understandable and easy to argue point. Developing 
new markets is not easily done and discovering new resources to manufacture and 
export was unpredictable. There is little evidence to suggest that Postlethwayt would 
know of such new resources or products either. This is a common theme in politics: 
bemoaning the rise of a foreign power as if its growth comes at the expense of 
another, when that isnÕt necessarily the case at all - it could provide new markets for a 
an overall in the volume of trade.
121
 
These are the guiding ideas behind Metropolism, and now the research will explore 
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the practical ways in which these ideas manifested. Postlethwayt identified a natural 
division in trade between Ôhome and foreignÕ trade, with each possessing Ôwidely 
different principlesÕ and there being frequent ÔconfusionÕ between the two.
122
 This 
research will categorise the work accordingly, beginning in Chapter IV by exploring 
the role of the metropole. 
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IV 
The Role of the Metropole 
Postlethwayt suggests that Ôevery member of society ought to be distinguished in 
proportion to the services he rendersÕ to the Ôgeneral interestÕ of the nation. There are 
three main ways in which this can be done. Firstly, men could be ÔretailersÕ who 
purchase the Ôproductions of the land, and of the industry of its inhabitantsÕ and re-sell 
them to other citizens. This enables the ÔcirculationÕ of domestically manufactured 
goods and wealth. Men could also be ÔmanufacturersÕ: Ôguiding and directing the 
labour of a number of other citizens to prepare and form the first materialsÕ. This 
process is both Ôvery necessaryÕ as it Ôincreases the real and relative riches of a stateÕ. 
Lastly, a man could export the Ôproductions of his countryÕ in exchange for the 
Ônecessary productionsÕ of another Ôor for moneyÕ. This is called the Ôwholesale tradeÕ 
and is carried on by ÔmerchantsÕ. Much of this is common sense - nobody would 
dispute that these groups exist; their importance lies in how they reflect the absolute 
importance of trade to Metropolism and if you do not contribute positively to this 
then, you are a drain. It is these main trades and groups of workers that drive the 
success or failure of a state and Metropolism outlines how they ought best be directed 
to most effectively serve Ôthe general interestÕ of the nation. 
123
 
For Postlethwayt the pursuit of a positive balance of trade had concrete and 
meaningful advantages beyond a higher relative rate of trade and self-sufficiency. At 
the heart of a successful economy were Ôagriculture and industryÕ and Ôwithout 
industry the fruits of the earth can have no value: if agriculture be neglected, the 
fountain of trade is dried upÕ.
124
 In its generality, it is hard to dispute the point - 
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industry was key to the manufacture of goods and agriculture provided the sustenance 
people needed to survive and to work, as well as ensuring self-sufficiency. However 
the main point here is that it demonstrates the need to maximise domestic 
employment in these fields - to ensure the Ôfountain of tradeÕ is flowing as freely as 
possible.
125
 This corresponds with Earle, who claims that fear for the Ôstability of the 
commonwealthÕ motivated mercantilist thought and one way in which this manifested 
was in the desire to reduce domestic unemployment.
126
 Metropolism shares this desire 
to reduce unemployment, though it more positively endorses the benefits it could have 
to BritainÕs commercial endeavours. 
 Postlethwayt is highly celebratory towards manufacture, calling it Ôingenious 
labourÉ the art of working up the productions of natureÕ.
127
 It is also natural that as 
soon as Ôone nation should about to work upÕ their available natural resources then 
this will stimulate growth in that region, thereby enticing other groups to emulate and 
improve upon these works even though they would have been no Ôless happyÕ without 
doing so.
128
 In essence, once one group improves beyond basic subsistence, it creates 
a spiral of competition and necessity that leads to consumption and the trade systems 
of PostlethwaytÕs time. It is important to consider that he also privately cultivated a 
keen interest in both the lead and iron industries during his life, possibly shaping or 
shaped by this praise for manufacturing.
129
 He criticises past policies towards 
manufactures which had, through ÔignoranceÕ granted Ôexclusive privilegesÕ to 
ÔrewardÕ those who took the ÔriskÕ of investing in new processes of manufacture, a 
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policy that brought new pressures on the grantees and limited that ÔprivilegeÕ even, as 
so often did, failed.
130
 Therefore in totality, they were bad for the nation as they 
restricted the use of new processes or manufactures in order to better manage the 
Ôprice of either first materials or workmanshipÕ as well as to avoid the mistakes of 
older patents.
131
 What was encouraged under Metropolism were Ômitigated patentsÕ, 
restricted to a Ôsmall number of yearsÕ or on a regional basis, thereby rewarding 
innovation but not permanently trapping the idea with its creators.
132
 Beyond this 
rudimentary, pre-commercial development the competitive industry between two 
states is dependent on two factors; the amount of consumptive population and the 
amount of consumption of Ôforeign ingenuityÕ.
133
 It has already been established how 
vital the reduction of foreign imports (and by extension, the consumption of said 
imports) is to Metropolism and the need to increase self-sufficiency and competitorsÕ 
dependency upon Britain through a positive general balance of trade, but the 
development of a consumer population is also important. 
 There are many practical benefits to this objective. With the advent of the consumer 
revolution, the nature of work was changing from lifestyle to occupation, creating 
vast (and growing) groups of people with expendable income.
134
 This manifested in 
varying ways from the development of luxury brands such as Wedgwood pottery to 
the hoarding of newspapers by Ôlower sortsÕ as a type of status symbol.
135
 Food riots 
were prevalent and used strategically to gain advantages. People, not just merchants, 
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were increasingly active in personal-economic terms.
136
  
 These changes also helped develop the perceived vice of unemployment, a view 
propagated by Postlethwayt: complaining that Ôa great number of beggars may live 
comfortably, though the body-politic receives no part of its strength from themÕ - their 
ÔcontagiousÉ idlenessÕ is actively harming the nation.
137
 These men were 
characterised as idle - Ôdeserters from tillage, navigation and manufactories, did not 
want for employment and wagesÕ - and absurdly, this state of being would lead to a 
Ômore debauched life, too often supported by larcenyÕ, a significant crime for a policy 
that prioritises the production and sale of consumer goods.
138
 With increased 
awareness and fear of unemployment, attempting to reduce it had obvious social 
benefits. With the increase in consumerism and the changes in the structure of society, 
the unemployed were a drain on commerce - these people were not purchasing from 
British merchants and wholesalers, who in turn were not receiving this money and 
could therefore not reinvest it. For Metropolism the Ôintent of commerce in a state is, 
by labour, to maintain in ease and plenty as many men as possibleÕ, both a moral and 
a practical consideration.
139
 In practical terms, the greater the population that is 
engaged in consumerism, the greater the ÔcirculationÕ of goods or bullion, which 
(depending on the exact goods) is purchased instead of rival goods, creates wealth for 
the manufacturers who can then reinvest the profit into greater employment and 
production or develops further consumer interest in said goods: the nation where a 
Ôgreat trade flourishesÉ will always be the most populousÕ and this great population 
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stimulates greater ÔtradeÕ.
140
 
 On a more primal level, the unemployed were a threat to political stability. Because 
seigniorage had disappeared, a personÕs occupation was no longer connected to a 
local noble but to a national government. Employment created and bolstered domestic 
stability - in theory at least. This corresponds well with other mercantilist writers, who 
often sought to reduce unemployment as well as address other social concerns.
141
 
Another consideration should be the target audience of Metropolism - national 
politicians. The Marquis of Granby was the declared recipient of BritainÕs 
Commercial Interest while the Universal Dictionary is inscribed to ÔGeorge Nelson, 
ESQ. Lord Mayor of the City of London and to the Aldermen, and Common 
CouncilÕ.
142
 Variously, these politicians would not have wanted social discontent 
from unemployment as it directly affected their status; particularly the Lord Mayor of 
the City of London, whose role primarily involved ÔLondon TradesmenÕ and ÔLondon 
MerchantsÕ who maintained strong networks with Ôcountry shop-keepersÕ - a trade 
network that could be threatened by social unease.
143
 Therefore Postlethwayt - in 
serving his (sometimes potential) employers, would have to address their needs and 
concerns, of which this would be one. In a letter early in his career to then-employer 
Robert Walpole, Postlethwayt claims that they will ÔblasteÕ their ÔenemiesÉ for everÕ  
and he implies that he is one of the Ôpeople supplying the spinÕ to do this blasting.
144
 
It does seem accurate to some extent, to agree with Bennett that Postlethwayt was a 
spin-doctor as well as corroborating with historians that criticise the sliminess of 
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mercantilist literature as Ôfrequently particular, political and polemicalÕ.
145
 Of course 
many of the ideas of Metropolism carry their own validity but it is imperative to 
consider such factors. 
 Though Metropolism did endorse and invite for consumerism, it did not want to 
overindulge in it. It permitted indulgence in art that Ôto the eye of reason might 
seemÉ most frivolousÕ or the Ômost trifling of commodityÕ. Some examples of such 
frivolity might be Ôforeign dolls, glass-ware, combs and pins, especially FrenchÕ. 
Despite the negative tone of PostlethwaytÕs writing towards ÔfashionsÕ with their 
Ôcontinual changesÕ and their effect on the Ôlevity and fickleness of a peopleÕ, he 
claims that one should not mock those who ÔfollowÕ such fashions (providing that 
they can Ôafford itÕ) - the Ôreal ridicule consists in complaining of fashionsÕ. It is easy 
to see why - their consumption helps ÔtradeÕ in general and in the ÔcirculationÕ of 
wealth, though as always domestic produce is preferable to a foreign rival, where 
available. He even cites the case of Phillip IIÕs ÔedictsÉ to forbid the importationÕ of 
these type of luxury goods as an error of judgement. That is not to say that 
metropolism doesnÕt consider the possibility of excess - it is very easy Ôto carry 
luxury to too great a heightÕ, which would lead to the neglect of the Ôlands and most 
necessary artsÕ that are of primary importance to the success of a nation. It is the duty 
of the legislature to Ôcheck the excessÕ and Ômaintain a just equilibrium between the 
several occupations of the subjectÕ through Ôprivileges and immunitiesÕ to the 
suffering parts and to Ômake the taxes fall on the home consumption of articles of 
luxuryÕ. Indeed, the Ôbody politicÕ should Ôencourage, restrain, or absolutely prohibit 
the use of commodities, either national or foreignÕ in accordance to the needs of the 
state at that particular point. This is not stringent or doctrinaire, but an incredibly 
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flexible policy that permits luxury goods - even foreign ones - so long as they service 
the national interest at that point of time. Metropolism operates under a constant 
thrust to ever improve the balance of trade; to improve and to grow, so there will 
always be changes in the balance of power of which the politicians need to be 
cognizant of.
146
 
 This is reminiscent of HeckscherÕs statement that mercantilism often operated with a 
belief in free trade but under the Ôdextrous management of a skilful politicianÕ.
147
 The 
constant monitoring of the balance between acceptable consumption and excessive 
luxury prioritises the general wellbeing of the state over the interests of private 
merchants or producers, which seems natural and understandable for a writer who was 
employed by national politicians. While any decision is ideological, this can be seen 
as a reasoned, pragmatic approach that encourages consumption except at the expense 
of the national economy and hardly constitutes an imposition on free trade. However 
this is not an unreasonable approach - the early-to-mid eighteenth-century was a 
tumultuous time for economic crises, and excessive interest in a product or market 
could lead to market crashes.
148
 There is an argument that the crisis is a natural part of 
an economic cycle, creating a cleansing effectÕ that eradicates the inefficient, and lead 
to increased investment in Ôhuman capitalÕ, which could serve as a long term benefit 
to the nation.
149
 However in the short term, crises could be harmful, forcing increased 
risk aversion, reduced access to credit, shrinking of networks if the merchant's 
personal ÔreputationÕ was not sufficient to weather the storm, they had bad 
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information or were simply unlucky; all of which would hurt the economy through 
reduced employment and lowered spending.
150
 Ultimately, if crises were for the best, 
such regulation would not be beneficial, as it would artificially interfere with the 
ability of the economy to readjust itself. However it is important to distinguish 
between private and governmental crises. The impact of governmental crises tended 
to be Ôconfined to the financial sectorÕ and check this quote Ôdivorced from theÕ 
essential Ômanufacturing and trading economyÕ, whereas private crises had significant 
and meaningful effects on the traders in the metropole and colonial traders within 
their networks.
151
 With such private crises being increasingly prevalent it seems 
natural that government policy would look to micro-manage private markets through 
taxation to attempt to discourage bubbles and maintain a stable economy.
152
 With the 
systems of economic security at the time, Metropolism sought to do what it could to 
maintain its own existential threats, in this case taxation to try and pre-emptively cut 
off potential threats to the economic system. 
Tax policies such as these that were loosely proscribed for when excess occurred 
contribute to the deadly cycle of taxation, piracy and more ÔburdensomeÕ taxation that 
Smith warned of.
153
 However this is the opposite of what Metropolism sought to do. 
A Ôcountry cannot supply another with any commodity, which it does not sell as 
cheap as it can be bought elsewhereÕ - price competitiveness is vital and would not be 
possible with heavy taxation as that would force the sale price higher in order for the 
producer or seller to still profit.
154
 If a country is not maximising its current potential 
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trade by pursuing the highest achievable number of exports and limiting its imports 
(goals which a lack of price competitiveness will impede), then it will not be able to 
maximise employment and by extension, domestic commerce will be harmed.
155
  
In fact, Metropolism sought to minimise domestic taxation in order to facilitate trade 
success. This was not a protectionist approach. There were four factors that drove 
price competitiveness. Firstly, with a population engaging in Ôplenty of consumptionÕ, 
the Ôrivalship of cultivatorsÕ was both necessary and inevitable in keeping prices at 
internationally-competitive lows.
156
 This Ôdomestic rivalshipÕ creates ÔplentyÕ and 
keeps the prices of Ôprovisions of the first materials, of labour and of moneyÕ low - 
which has obvious impact on the wider economy.
157
 It is also imperative that in 
markets where the ÔwantsÕ of colonies and foreign buyers are Ôable to employ still 
more men than are to be foundÕ that the economy Ôoeconomise[sic]Õ. 
158
 This meant 
utilising machines or animals to perform labour where it would come at Ôless expense 
or more safetyÕ to the workers.
159
 It could be argued that this drive for labour 
efficiency comes at the expense of the stated goals of Metropolism - Ôthe 
populousness of the stateÕ which enabled (and was enabled by) a readily employed 
population that could engage in a consumer economy, but this is not the case at all - Ôa 
nation loses itÕs trade when it does not carry on so greatÕ as it can achieve.
160
 If a 
country does not maximise its potential then it will be usurped by a rival who will 
instead supply the goods for a lower price. There is an efficiency drive here that 
connects Metropolism with the increasingly liberal thinking of the time. 
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 ÔFreedom of TradeÕ is not inherently hampered by ÔrestrictionsÕ: it only is applicable 
Ôin carrying on with ease that trade which is consistent with the real general interest of 
societyÕ. Activities outside of this Ôgeneral interestÕ are a Ôlicentiousness destructive 
of trade itselfÕ. In essence, this calls for minimised regulation on trades that will 
improve the Metropole in order to stimulate the most beneficial competition between 
producers and manufacturers alongside active regulation to limit those trades which 
will cause harm to the stateÕs general interest. This is a flexible and non-specific 
policy that fits with the general aims of Metropolism to ensure a positive balance of 
trade through encouraging employment and consumption.
161
 
 This argument seems contrived and convoluted. The persistent implicit references to 
external criticisms of his belief in freedom of trade are noticeable. Postlethwayt 
mentioned that freedom of trade was Ôso much talked of and so little understoodÕ 
while he persistently stresses how vital Ôthe soul of freedomÕ is to trade.
162
 There is a 
sense that he was cognizant of free-trade advocates criticizing his work and sought to 
counter this criticism here, though it does sound overly defensive. As a 
(sometimes)spin-doctor, we can see from his private correspondence that he was 
aware of his and his suitorsÕ critics and sought to counter them.
163
 However, arguing 
over the extent to which someone endorses free trade can be circuitous - it is far easier 
to claim things are not free enough when you have no power to affect change, because 
quite often any legislation by a government will arguably infringe somebodyÕs 
freedom. Nevertheless, we see here that Metropolism favoured as free a trade as 
possible amongst domestic producers and Postlethwayt called himself an ÔenemyÕ to 
                                            
161
 Postlethwayt, BritainÕs Commercial Interest: Volume II, pp. 386-390. 
162
 Postlethwayt, BritainÕs Commercial Interest: Volume II, pp. 386-387. 
163
 Cholmondeley, 2202. 
 42 
monopolies, which is reflected in his writing here.
164
 MetropolismÕs approach to 
domestic trade cannot be described illiberal and reflects HeckscherÕs claims that 
mercantilists endorsed free trade too, albeit in a more nuanced form.
165
 
 This is MetropolismÕs attitude to free trade and regulation domestically. However, 
the domestic and the foreign avenues of trade perform very different functions within 
Metropolism. They can be considered separate spheres that drive for the shared 
objective of primacy for the Metropole amidst international rivals. The foreign 
strategy of Metropolism will be explored in the next chapter, Ôthe Philosophy of 
Foreign Trade and its RegulationÕ. 
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V 
The Philosophy of Foreign Trade and its Regulation 
Malachy PostlethwaytÕs Britain which was become increasingly cognizant and 
comfortable within an internationally-connected world. From 1700-1800 foreign trade 
grew astronomically. British imports rose by Ô523%Õ, exports by Ô568%Õ and re-
exports by Ô906%Õ against a population increase in England of only Ô257%Õ: a 
significant Ôper capitaÕ increase.
166
 British workers would manufacture goods 
imported from American colonies that were extracted with the labour of slaves 
shipped over from Africa. Coffee, a Caribbean or South American bean grew to be a 
commodity consumed by thousands and later coffee houses became a place of social 
and economic interaction within a community.  Different races and religions 
interacted more and on a scale unlike ever before and different national stereotypes 
and identities began to be recognised. British traders operated across the globe, such 
as Levant company factors operating out of Turkey and the Mediterranean, where 
they encountered other European traders, (in their view)tyrannical local leaders, new 
languages and new experiences.
 167
  All in all, this irrevocably changed world meant 
that Britain could no longer ignore foreign nations as it looked to strengthen itself. 
This Ôvast expansion of world trade and overseas explorationÕ as well as the Ôrise of 
nation-states as political entitiesÕ had a significant effect on the literature surrounding 
trade, and Postlethwayt was not ignorant to this.
168
 Metropolism too, did not ignore 
these international factors, and placed great importance on configuring the system to 
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combat external threats to the MetropoleÕs prosperity, and the manner of these 
policies differed greatly from the domestic approach described in the previous 
chapter.
169
 This chapter will focus on the two major strands of MetropolismÕs 
approaches to foreign affairs: firstly its complex relationship with international rivals 
and then its policy towards colonies within the system of trade. 
 It is little surprise that Postlethwayt devoted time and rigorous attention to foreign 
methods of trade. Through PostlethwaytÕs career and his published works, he showed 
a willingness to explore the works of foreign writers as well as research the way in 
which foreign governments sought to encourage and manage trade. The Universal 
Dictionary that Postlethwayt published owed much of its content to the writing of 
Jacques Savary des Brulons.
170
 Postlethwayt, in justifying his translation of the 
original text, presumptuously claims that the original author(s) would not Ôenvy 
foreigners the advantages they may derive from this work; wherein the subject is so 
treated as to prove beneficial to all the European nations, in regard to the reciprocal 
cultivation of their commerce and the universal extension of their navigationÕ.
171
 This 
seems self-congratulatory because so much of metropolism is posited in relative terms 
- typically with France but also other rival European nations. This was natural within 
a strategy that sought to enhance British self-sufficiency and to increase the 
dependency of foreign states upon British manufactured exports.
172
 Also, in the 
foreword that is addressed to the Marquis of Granby, he mentions that Ôthere are many 
things, which the course of my studies has led me to that are by no means proper to be 
made publicÕ, demonstrating that he isnÕt reciprocating the apparent generosity 
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provided to him.
173
 
 Furthermore, he shows an alarming devotion to studying and understanding the 
French trade regulations and the manner this enabled them usurp British trade 
supremacy. The attention to detail here is comprehensive. He explores Ôpermissions 
for sailingÕ which restricted vessels that could Ôsail from the ports and havens of the 
colonies, and other French establishmentsÕ unless they attained Ôlicences from the 
admiraltyÕ which had to be renewed on an annual basis and these were specific to the 
route on which they operated, for example the same permit would not apply to the 
Ôtrade in the river and gulph[sic] of St. LawrenceÕ and those who traded Ôfrom island 
to islandÕ in the Caribbean.
174
 This policy is reminiscent of the Navigation acts that 
England legislated through the seventeenth century, placing limitations on shipping in 
various fashions, including limits on the nationality of the crew.
175
 Variously these 
acts had sought to improve the supply of skilled sailors for future naval endeavours,  
protect English trade routes and encourage shipping.
176
 Policies such as this had been 
intended Ôto reduce the commercial hegemony and competition of a rival nationÕ: the 
Dutch, which it would do by limiting their ability to provide shipping.
177
 However the 
efficacy of these acts has been questioned: by the 1690s, they had created a Ônear 
monopolyÕ for colonial exporter in English territory but this Ôwas a benefit to 
colonists, not to inhabitants of EnglandÕ.
178
 This is absolutely not appropriate for 
Metropolism, which places the prosperity of Britain above all else. Therefore it is 
little surprise that Postlethwayt would be looking at French legislation in order to 
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improve upon previously unsuccessful British policy, because in theory these limits 
on shipping match MetropolismÕs intentions. He has claimed that providing ÔfreightÕ 
can be a profitable enterprise, which such legislation enables, which also provides 
employment for citizens to spend on British manufactures and increases British self-
sufficiency.
179
 Policies, potentially inspired by those of the French, would be ideal in 
achieving these goals while also amending for the failings of previous legislature. 
 It is significant that he consulted the legislation of BritainÕs major trade rival for 
this.
180
 Metropolism saw international trade as a fiercely competitive arena where any 
advantage that could be seized, must be seized. These regulations were just one more 
means of  improvement, by learning from the rapid rise of the French. Commerce, for 
Metropolism, was a glorious and competitive endeavour entwined with international 
warfare. He questions, Ôif we donÕt battle our enemies in trade as well as in war, with 
weapons equally powerful is it not in vain, it it not superlatively weak and ridiculous 
to expect equal success in either?Õ.
181
 It is necessary to remember that this rhetoric is 
natural in an address designed to persuade the South Sea Company to act and so the 
language may reflect a more extreme portrayal of his views. However, it is clear that 
external concerns drive metropolismÕs commercial policy. 
 This competitive approach was to be driven through a centralised body politic with 
Ôone head, one hand, one purse to answer one united particular interest made most 
widely subservient to the interest of the wholeÕ, an approach he had discovered from 
the French.
182
 Gone here are the proclamations of free trade and the necessary, 
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advantageous Ôrivalship of cultivatorsÕ.
183
 The pressing issue for Metropolism is the 
drive to Ômaintain a balance of power in EuropeÉ AsiaÉ AfricaÕ and as Chapter III 
showed, superiority in trade meant power.
184
Trade networks were to be rigorously 
controlled through the micro-management of politicians - active statesmanship, 
reminiscent of HeckscherÕs identification of mercantilists achieving their ends 
through Ôdextrous management of a skilful politicianÕ.
185
 Though such regulation has 
its critics - Smith chief amongst them - there is a driving logic behind it that 
corresponds with the fundamentals of Metropolism. As an ÔentrepotÕ country, like 
Holland, the Ôprimary purpose of trade was to maximise profits from re-exporting to 
Europe the goods of distant marketsÕ or colonial goods refined in the Metropole.
186
 
The Ôrecognition that the international distribution of profits from such trade could be 
altered by commercial policiesÕ incentivised legislators and commentators like 
Postlethwayt to Ôadopt measures to capture these rents for one's own countryÕ.
187
 
 Postlethwayt was sceptical of the possibility of a Ôgeneral freedom of tradeÕ in 
Ôdistant commerceÕ on any ÔpermanentÕ basis being able to reach levels of trade Ôany 
thing like what the meanest of our rivals doÕ and thus should not be pursued. In this 
particular case, he talks of the East India trade where VOC Ôis attended with 
unspeakable commercial emolument to the HollandersÕ. Despite its shortcoming, 
Postlethwayt believed that leaving this market to Ôan unrestrained liberty of tradeÕ 
would hurt British involvement so much that it Ôwould not be worth carrying on at all.  
On the other hand, he claimed that the East India Company Ôcannot afford to trade at 
so small an expenceÕ and at so Ôsmall a profit as private tradersÕ so cannot effectively 
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compete within a wider market. He correctly identifies the Ôprimary motiveÕ for the 
original establishment of the these monopolistic Ôjoin-stocksÕ was to Ôcut outÉ new 
channels of trafficÕ, a pursuit that few Ôprivate people will hazardÕ, and should 
continue that function by the same logic. Such monopolies could and had proved 
ÔinjuriousÕ with when regulated properly they could better protect British trade 
interests. It should be noted that Postlethwayt never explicitly mentions what these 
regulations specifically entail beyond a return of monopoly status to major trading 
companies, a desire for it to be Ôwell-adapted to the peculiar circumstancesÕ of the 
particular trade while still in line with the nationÕs general interest, and funding for 
the maintenence of forts. It was an all or nothing choice. Monopolies could be 
troublesome, if ineffectively regulated but faced with rival monopoly companies there 
was no choice but to match it, else Britain would lose out in the entire trade. In line 
with MetropolismÕs principles, the behaviour of competitors was the chief concern 
and in this arms race, the only possible solution was escalation.
188
 
 Here he reflects a pragmatic attitude to liberty, stating that despite Ôour fondness for 
the words liberty and freedomÕ they can also Ôlead to licentiousness and even anarchy 
in governmentÕ.
189
 Again this indicates that he, more than an academic or a 
philosopher, had to work within the confines of what was achievable as much as what 
was morally or ethically correct. Metropolism was very much a practicable series of 
policies or direction for policy. This idea is not dissimilar to SmithÕs complaints about 
the greed and lack of patriotism of merchants - liberty could and was abused, though 
of course they then configure this into very different practices of liberty.
190
 To 
PostlethwaytÕs credit there was a practical justification behind this endorsement of 
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monopolies. Douglas Irwin states that the competition for Ôlong-distance trade from 
EuropeÉ could take the form of a game in which government policy could be 
strategically employed to shift a noncooperative equilibrium among the trading 
companies to an outcome more advantageous to one countryÕs firmÕ and because this 
trade was Ôset along certain "channels" that could not accommodate more traffic, 
entry was possible only by displacing existing merchantsÕ.
191
 This practice, called 
Ômonopolistic competitiveÕ by Klein and Veluwenkamp, had been a key innovation 
by the Dutch as European nations first began to develop trade in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries.
192
 Immanuel Wallerstein agreed, viewing mercantilist policies 
as a ÔweaponÕ to reclaim profits in a period of general stagnation.
193
 To use 
PostlethwaytÕs examples, the Dutch and the French had outwitted the British through 
their regulation in the East-India and African (respectively) trades and prospered as a 
result.
194
 He is correct to try and identify better regulations rather than simply calling 
for greater investment, because as IrwinÕs close mathematical analysis of the Anglo-
Dutch Ôimperfectly competitive long-distance commerce of the periodÕ in the East 
Indies reveals, success was not achieved Ôthrough subsidiesÕ but through creative 
regulation that incentivised revenue.
195
 However theses analyses focus primarily on 
seventeenth-century trade, which was becoming increasingly different to the world in 
which Postlethwayt operated - and this change would only hasten by the 1760Õs 
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onwards.
196
 The escalation of regulation may have been outstripping the needs of 
British merchants, who in the seventeenth century had needed the protection of the 
Navigation Acts due to a lack of Ôcapital or expertiseÕ but this was increasingly untrue 
by the mid-eighteenth century.
197
 
 This appears to reflect the deep-seated pragmatism of Metropolism - this Ôgeneral 
freedomÕ is clearly part of the intellectual climate of the time.
198
 It could be a 
reflection of PostlethwaytÕs inner beliefs; he says that the Ôdue spirit of liberty may be 
ever cherished amongst usÕ, but more likely it is a pre-emptive response to a popular 
criticism - and the evidence suggests that he was keenly aware of his critics due to his 
role as a Ôspin-doctorÕ.
199
 There is a valid argument to be made that such opposition to 
freedom of trade on an international level makes Metropolism illiberal but such ideas 
are rooted in the changes and developments of a political economy in the mid-
seventeenth century. This ties Postlethwayt into an intellectual trend that developed in 
the Commonwealth era. ÔTradeÉ was the true interest of EnglandÕ, according to 
Ômany defenders of the commonwealthÕ and they promoted an Ôeconomics of 
abundanceÕ but had not fully developed into what Joyce Appleby calls the  Ôeconomic 
rationalistÔ that Ôhad no space for the stateÕ.
200
 Though Metropolism is ruthless in its 
desire for trade, the state plays a pivotal role in achieving these goals. 
Despite foreign nations motivating this regulation, there was not an inherent dislike of 
foreigners, simply a recognition that these nations were an existential threat to the 
metropole. Postlethwayt wrote that by Ôdrawing over workmen from aboardÕ the 
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metropole could attain Ôan advantageous balance of commerceÕ provided that their 
skills are effectively and correctly put to use in trades that serve the general interest. 
As mentioned earlier, it is imperative that a nation attempt to maximise its trade and 
this applies to attracting foreign workers: a nation should establish Ôpublic diversionsÕ  
as an ÔallurementÕ or to ÔpleaseÕ and ÔseduceÕ the valuable foreign workers that can 
provide a positive contribution to the MetropoleÕs trade. He goes on to say that Ôit is 
highly proper that all who come capable of increasing the number of commodities, or 
who bring their fortunes with them, should, on conforming to the laws of that country, 
enjoy all the prerogatives of subjectsÕ. This is a surprisingly progressive opinion that 
reflects the rapacious yet liberal desire to improve the power of the Metropole through 
drawing in people who can spend more on domestic goods or bring new skills or ideas 
to develop manufacture or trade techniques/contacts more efficiently. It also reflects 
how European rivals were not enemies - the states were in competition but the 
individuals were seen as capable as British workers, if correctly employed. As will be 
shown in Chapter V, this attitude was not shared with the people who were enslaved, 
though they too could be of great use to the Metropole. He even states that due to Ôthe 
division of Europe into several sovereignties has left policy no other resource 
whereby to obtain superiorityÕ, demonstrating the cynicism behind the policy and the 
high level of competition with the other European states.  This approach does not 
contravene the standard objectives of Metropolism - in this case trying to ensure the 
maximum possible domestic employment - for it is Ôindispensably necessary to 
employ those we have in the best manner possibleÕ before employing skilled 
European workers. At its core, Metropolism priorities the improvement of the 
metropole and if that is achieved with foreign workers then it is pragmatic enough to 
permit that, although there is a telling statement in his work: he calls for public works 
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to attract these foreigners, which Ôcannot be too much variedÉ nor too magnificentÕ, 
but suggests that they be located in the ÔcapitalÕ, showing that the metropole was 
perhaps London, not Britain in its entirety.
201
 
Metropolism sits far away from Adam SmithÕs vision of a free trading, regulation-
light world. It envisioned a specific, lightly-regulated domestic market in which 
competition is encouraged that is facilitated by a series of servile markets which are 
rigorously controlled through policy and military. While critics may rail against its 
restrictive regulation, it is important to remember that international rivals, especially 
the Dutch and the French perceived Britain as a similar threat and regulated their 
trade accordingly.
202
 The Dutch, for example were able to prosper in the East-India 
trade because of a Ômanagerial incentive schemeÕ that can be described as creative 
regulation rather than imposing regulation: 
Dutch managers were compensated on the basis of both the firm's revenue and 
its profits, thus giving them a direct financial interest in increasing the 
turnover of the company when determining its shipping schedule. This scheme 
committed the firm to a higher trading volume than it would have chosen 
under a scheme that linked managers' salaries only to profits. Without a 
credible commitment  mechanism, the optimal, profit-maximizing response of 
the English was to reduce their output and, hence, their profits.
203
 
These rival nations were competing in similar regions/markets and became 
increasingly intricate - critics might argue byzantine - in their approaches to 
                                            
201
 Postlethwayt, BritainÕs Commercial Interest: Volume II, pp. 528-533; this could be jumping to 
conclusions, for there are practical reasons to focus the diversions in London, due to its size and 
ubiquity, but as a London-born writer who concentrated on London-based politics it is not a difficult 
stretch to make either. 
202
 Postlethwayt, BritainÕs Commercial Interest: Volume II, passim, explores examples of the FrenchÕs 
regulation for trade. 
203
 Irwin, ÔStrategic trade policyÕ, p. 136. 
 53 
regulation. In this context it is only natural that Postlethwayt - an assistant to 
politicians and pointedly not an academic - would advocate for similar policies and he 
devoted long sections of his work to repeating this regulation. A politician is bound 
by practical realities and when faced with rival legislation he will be pressured by 
lobbyists pressing for greater regulation for this market or lessened regulations 
elsewhere - change is inherently incremental and hence a radical change that would 
open markets would irritate various interest groups. Opening up markets would 
potentially leave British traders vulnerable to foreign rivals, crippling its balance of 
trade and weakening the prosperity of the Metropole by their own logic. There may be 
many advantages to be had by doing so - as free trade advocates would suggest - but 
that is not the point; actually doing it is far more difficult than merely criticising 
systems which are already in place. Therefore, Metropolism is more practical and 
pragmatic, requiring a measured but critical view on regulation and the extent to 
which liberty in trade should be pursued. 
 This international competition also manifested in military conflict, an eventuality that 
was dangerous to the general level of trade and the general level of trust.
204
 The next 
chapter will explore how Metropolism proposed to use ÔWar and Alliance as 
Economic WeaponsÕ. 
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VI 
War and Alliance as Economic Weapons 
During PostlethwaytÕs lifetime there were several wars including the Queen AnneÕs 
War, the War of Austrian Succession and the War of JenkinsÕ Ear, mainly pursued 
over trading interests, be it out of aggression or out of defence.
205
 This became the 
norm in BritainÕs and its rival countries. Postlethwayt fully subscribed to this belief, 
demanding the combination of military and commercial power into a Ômercantile 
trading interestÕ for he believed that the French traders, Ôour rivals, control the 
militaryÕ.
206
  
 Under Metropolism, a Ômere military forceÕ would be incapable of achieving the 
commercial ends necessary for overseas ventures. They would be ÔcapableÉ of 
supporting forts and garrisonsÕ but the Ôconduct of such uncommercial gentlemenÕ 
would Ôbe more liable to destroy than cultivate commercial friendshipsÕ than a nation 
Ôwho constitute a trading interest at the head of their militaryÕ. The military would 
therefore need the guiding hand and wit of a merchant.
207
 
 In effect, Postlethwayt believed military-men lacked the skill to forge networks and 
manage trade effectively whereas merchants had to be multi-functional: managing a 
Ôstream of foreign remittancesÕ, collecting ÔspecieÕ, continually studying Ôprices, of 
both domestic and foreign markets as well as of bills of exchange, as the best 
barometer of immediate business conditionsÕ, constantly Ôspreading and takingÔ of 
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risks and Ôget along with and evaluate peopleÕ.
208
 It was a complex occupation to 
which many historians and sociologists have applied the term ÔentrepreneurÕ. The 
historiography on this subject is rich and complex, but there is not the space here to 
discuss it. The key point is that these were specialists at Ômaking judgmental decisions 
about the coordination of scarce resourcesÕ.
209
 With foreign success in trade being 
(comparatively) mutually exclusive with the MetropoleÕs success, it is logical that 
combining these experts to perform the respective functions best served the balance of 
trade. David Ormrod calls this a ÔnationalistÕ system run by a Ôfiscal military stateÕ.
210
 
 Creating this military-commercial enterprise and the European arms race to it, could 
lead to war. War was rarely an ideal prospect for Atlantic traders. The structures of 
trade were rudimentary and slow at the time and personal trust was vital when 
engaging in overseas trade. Trust was Ôlocated in the no-manÕs land between status 
and contractÕ and was necessary when balancing numerous risk factors in 
international trade as well as the factor/agent/merchant that was being traded with.
211
 
Because most traders were precariously placed, Ôrelations of obligation and 
dependence formed commercial bondsÕ, providing Ôstrong reasons for stressing 
cooperationÕ within the limited market framework of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.
212
 Due to capital requirements, trade was often pursued inside a Ôfamily 
matrixÕ and if a business developed, it tended to absorb new traders into this extended 
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kinship, according to Peter Mathias.
213
 Wars added a greater level of risk, impeding 
the development of new business and networks, as traders were forced to resort to 
Ôtraditional forms of risk managementÕ.
214
 Traders were forced to utilise these Ôstrong 
tiesÕ, as opposed to Ôweak tiesÕ, which could be more efficient in the rapid 
transmission of fresh or reliable information and new business opportunities.
215
 As the 
general level of risk increased and the general level of trust reduced, causing 
Ôtransaction cost[s] [to] become very highÕ, reducing the potential profits from an 
already more dangerous trade.
216
 Because crises were so prominent in this period, 
most traders planned for crises, having either learnt from previous experience or 
through knowledge accumulated within their Ônetwork memoryÕ.
217
 One common 
manner in which traders did this was by diversifying into various trades to Ôprotect 
them from over-dependence on characteristically unreliable marketsÕ, though to do so 
required access to a greater variety of networks and the capital to engage in them, 
which could be difficult for lower-level traders.
218
  There is some dispute that war was 
always damaging to trade routes: Albane Forrestier claims that in trades where Britain 
had established a monopoly there was no need to rely solely on the personal and 
informal ties provided by networksÕ and that traders such as Tobin and Pinney were 
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Ôable to sustainÕ their Ôdynamic tradeÕ during wartime.
219
 However this represents just 
one firm, not the entire economy and in a period slightly later than PostlethwaytÕs 
lifetime. More than anything else it justifies PostlethwaytÕs earlier proposals for the 
establishment of monopolies as they helped mitigate risks that normally prevented 
normal trade during times of war. Metropolism also sought to minimise these risks 
through the frequent ÔrotationÕ of ÔshipsÕ around BritainÕs major trading ports and 
lines of trade, which could function as a convoy to Ôease freights and insuranceÕ for 
merchants as well as the obvious function of a convoy: defence.
220
  
 War could have positive effects: Ralph Carr, for example, Ôreceived no more 
consignments of tarÕ until Ôhigh war-time prices were in effectÕ.
221
 The Bright-Meyler 
firm profited from war through the opportunistic purchase of French Ôprize vesselsÕ 
and Ô£4000 worth of goodsÕ confiscated from Guadeloupe.
222
 Similarly, privateering 
boomed in times of war, providing opportunities for those able to secure letters of 
marque.
223
 However these were circumstantial and not conducive to the stable and 
growing trade that Metropolism required, and as already established, if a country does 
not try to pursue the maximum possible trade it will be usurped. Therefore war was 
only a viable pursuit if it ceded long-term advantages to the MetropoleÕs system of 
trade. 
 On a mechanistic level, despite the short-term issues, such wars were a logical 
pursuit in order to better BritainÕs commerce: 
                                            
219
 Forrestier, ÔRisk, KinshipÕ, pp. 913-915. 
220
 Postlethwayt, BritainÕs Commercial Interest: Volume II, pp. 340-341. 
221
 W. Roberts, ÔRalph Carr: A Newcastle Merchant and the American Colonial TradeÕ, Business 
History Review, 42/3 (Autumn, 1968), pp. 282-283. 
222
 K. Morgan(ed.), The Bright-Meyler Papers: A Bristol-West India Connection, 1732-1837 (Oxford, 
2007), pp. 350-351. 
223
 R. Ritchie, ÔGovernment Measures against Piracy and Privateering in the Atlantic Area, 1750-1850Õ, 
in D. Starkey, J., Moor, E. van Heslinga (eds.), Pirates and Privateers (Exeter, 1997), passim. 
 59 
The Anglo-Dutch commercial wars, mainly fought off the north-western coast 
of Europe, were instigated by the English in an effort to increase their market 
share in trade by capturing or destroying Dutch shipping. One could also view 
these wars as a way of establishing a credible reputation in a repeated game to 
secure a permanent change in the behaviour of a rival.
224
 
 
In such a game it was absolutely necessary to never blink be unrelenting. Thus, under 
Metropolism the Ôships of warÕ should Ôbe encreasedÕ both to protect BritainÕs own 
traders and to ÔannoyÕ that of its rivals. This constant harassment across the major 
trade routes and at major ports should both force a change in a rivalÕs behaviour and 
proportionally increase the ÔinsuranceÕ on an ÔenemyÕs tradeÕ. Producing these ships 
would be beneficial to metropole employment as well. These additional ships should 
move in convoy Õfrom England every four or six months, for Africa, America, and 
then home to Great BritainÕ, with the exception of the convoys engaging in the 
bilateral trade Ôto AmericaÕ. These would be particularly effective Ôin times of warÕ 
and the rotational system would allow for more Ôfrequent and certain convoysÕ, which 
would lover ÔfreightsÉ by at least, one quarter, as there will be great savings in 
seamanÕs wages, victualling, demurrage and the preservation of the shipsÕ. In theory 
this process would improve the efficiency and safety of freight while also damaging 
that of rivals. In addition to these rotating ships, there were to be Ôcruizing squadrons 
at Gibraltar and on the coast of PortugalÕ in order to Ôsuppress privateers, and seize 
our enemyÕs trading shipsÕ. This was a proactive policy to try and damage the trade of 
foreign rivalÕs (ideally removing them from routes and ports altogether) that 
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simultaneously protects British merchants and freighters. Once again, the military and 
the trading interests are combined.
225
  
 
Although it is dependent on being able to establish and maintain an effective navy, 
this idea reflects the reality that Irwin identified - Ômilitary power furthered economic 
gain, and vice versaÕ.
226
 This re-emphasises the historiographical discussion over 
whether mercantilism sought to achieve power, plenty or both.
227
 In this case, 
Metropolism appears to be more power-oriented given PostlethwaytÕs emphasis on 
the use of ships to weaken rival traders (which has a positive effect on British 
traders). Though it is important to remember that building, maintaining and manning 
these ships creates employment, meaning that under Metropolism the process of 
accumulating power also contributes to plenty and vice versa. 
 
War and trade were intertwined for Britain and its foreign rivals, a view that 
Postlethwayt was keen to develop further by integrating more directly trade interest 
with the military.
228
 However this does not mean that Metropolism actively sought 
war as it could be highly damaging to many traders; it was merely an important asset 
to have for defeating competitors. Metropolism was a pragmatic set of policies and 
any tool that could assist in securing its safety and success was promoted, be it war or 
alliance. Just as Postlethwayt encouraged the attraction of foreign workers, foreign 
rivals too could be allied with, to the benefit of Britain. He called for a Ônew systemÕ 
where there is a  Ôstricter union between Great Britain and the continent than she ever 
yet had though at a far less expense than they ever yet didÕ. He feared that an alliance 
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between the French and the Spanish was going to destroy British trade. The neutral 
nations - Ôthe Dutch, the Danes, the Swedes and the Hanse townsÕ would be as 
damaging to British efforts if they remained neutral or worse if they openly assisted 
BritainÕs enemies.
229
 Postlethwayt was particularly complimentary towards the Dutch, 
whose Ôpeculiar penurious Way of LivingÕ allowed them to provide Ômaritime 
carriageÉ cheaper than any other nationÕ, which was a potential advantage that 
British foreign policy had hitherto ignored.
230
 
If the French were denied these Ôneutral powers to carry their goods to foreign 
marketsÕ and Britain engaged in Ôreprisals on the French commerce without a 
declaration of warÕ, then a costly war could be pre-empted. The French Ôpublic creditÕ 
would be damaged by these measures, being less able to raise their ÔRoyal NavyÕ and 
less able to threaten Britain or its colonies.
231
  
 This new system required a more sophisticated approach to public finance, and thus 
Postlethwayt called for a change in the mechanisms of public debt. Postlethwayt 
identified the flaws of the system as he saw it. Millions of pounds of debt would be 
accumulated and never repaid, from funding wars, which with the accompanying rate 
of interest would saddle the nation with a costly ÔannuityÕ, for which the taxes to fund 
can Ônever be taken off till the Principal is paidÕ, leaving the commercial system 
ÔcloggedÕ up with taxes that reduce firmsÕ ability to achieve competitive costs. Under 
Metropolism, the process of providing credit to the Government would be made more 
consistent: Ôpublic creditorsÕ that consent to the reduction of the interest rates on their 
loan restructuring would have the ÔoptionÕ about what happened to the money that 
would be lost through this agreement - they could take this ÔsurplusÕ as part of their 
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Ôprincipal or notÕ. Furthermore, when funds were Ôappropriated to pay interestÕ to 
public creditors (commonly referred to as the Sinking Fund) but were insufficient to 
pay this interest, they should be legally obliged to Ômake goodÕ this Ôdeficiency. It 
was suggested that this should be made law to reduce the risks to public creditors 
whilst providing them greater protection and means of debt enforcement, while 
simultaneously disincentivising the accumulation of excessive national debt.
232
 
 Postlethwayt observed that due to a fundamental failure to use the Sinking Fund as 
intended, the nature of public debt had changed. The reduction of interest rates on 
these debts had reduced the value of their principal accordingly, with these creditors 
staying as Ôperpetual annuitantsÕ whose principals were never being paid due to the 
failure to correctly appropriate funds into the Sinking Fund. Creditors benefitted from 
this - a lower total debt was irrelevant when no political effort was being made to pay 
it off; the annuities they received provided regular income at lower risk than a higher 
principal that was never to be paid. The ÔsecurityÕ for these debts was the Ôtrade and 
navigationÕ of Britain, but as more debt accumulated, it was ever more necessary to 
increase the Ôpublic taxes on our tradeÕ: a burden that would eventually cripple 
BritainÕs foreign commerce and thereby hinder the security of these debts and 
annuities. Ensuring the prosperity of the nationÕs commerce was the only means of 
making a nation ÔrichÕ, and by extension the best means of guaranteeing payment to 
creditors.
233
 
 Postlethwayt is scathing towards Ôfunding and jobbingÕ, which Ôenrich the worst 
menÉ ruin the innocentÉ taints menÕs moralsÉ and defaces the principles of virtue 
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and fair dealingÕ, in addition to ÔbubblingÕ being detrimental to the public finance.
234
 
He was correct to identify the broad dangers of such practices: financial crises were 
increasingly prevalent through the eighteenth-century, with a famous example being 
the South Sea Bubble.
235
 An argument can be made as to the benefits of crises in 
providing ÔCreative DestructionÕ that cleanses the market of inefficient firms, but it 
would not be wise to encourage them artificially through rampant stock-jobbing, 
especially not for someone trying to maintain a career with leading politicians, for 
whom crises were politically dangerous.
236
 
 However, money that goes towards the navy, Ôdomestic militaryÕ sources, Ôpublic 
creditorsÕ or towards the collection of Ôpublic revenueÕ circulates through the British 
economy and therefore cannot be considered wasteful. Money that is circulating - 
annuities, for example - is not detrimental to the economy but principal debt is static 
and removed from the economy and therefore is damaging. Under Metropolism 
therefore, it is suggested that when money is needed in the short term, usually for war, 
the debt should be raised Ôamongst ourselves within the yearÕ and repaid to the 
ÔcontractorsÕ within the year. Because this debt is to be repaid within the year, the 
ÔcontractorsÕ can be certain about the re-payment timetable and that their principle 
will be repaid, better formalising the security for government creditors Ôat a much 
cheaper priceÕ. This would leave the Ôprincipal moneyÕ as a Ôlive trading capital stock 
constantly in the commercial channel of circulationÕ; thereby mitigating the rise of the 
national debt, limit the need for tax rises and keeping the money in circulation, while 
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still being able to fund war.
237
 
This restructuring of debt practice would enable the government to pursue foreign 
alliances more cheaply and efficiently.  PostlethwaytÕs knowledge of international 
diplomacy is questionable for there is no clear indication of how this negotiation was 
to be achieved beyond offering ÔsubsidiesÕ.
238
 However he clearly has in-depth 
knowledge of debt practice on a government scale.
239
 There is no evidence that he had 
any involvement in diplomacy or with diplomats. It is possible that Postlethwayt may 
have absorbed some information through his contacts and his political patrons, though 
that would be purely speculative. The relationship between him and his most 
prominent patron, Sir Robert Walpole, appears to have been quite close - he claimed 
to have served him for Ôtwelve yearsÕ and his letter, written in 1734, unabashedly 
asked for payment and jokes about their critics.
240
 It is possible that in this service 
Postlethwayt may have gained access to diplomatic sources, though again this is 
speculative. Irrespective of how possible such a policy was, it reflects the way in 
which Metropolism was shaped by external fears - of a France who Ôhave as greatly 
improved in the arts of war by sea and land as they have in the arts of commerceÕ - to 
the security and prosperity of the Metropole.
241
 
Superficially this seems at odds with Metropolism which otherwise sought self-
sufficiency where possible.
242
 However, Postlethwayt claimed that Britain could no 
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longer consider itself ÔomnipotentÔ and correctly, recognises that a nation that 
Ôdemands upon commerce for itÕs wealthÔ cannot be Ôemancipated from the 
continentÕ.
243
 This is common sense - domestic exports and domestic re-exports were 
predominantly sent to Europe across the Eighteenth Century.
244
 However it is also 
clear that domestic exports to Europe declined by 61% in the same period, largely due 
to protective policies across Europe.
245
 Postlethwayt himself believed that re-
exportation to Europe was where the Ôreal profitÕ was to be made, which certainly 
remained true for goods from the colonies.
246
 This shows how he was at a juncture in 
the development of trade. He prioritised European trade but Britain was soon to 
become more colonially and imperially-oriented. Postlethwayt undervalued the 
potential of colonial export markets, favouring the traditional model of European 
exportation at the expense of some self-sufficiency.
247
 
 However colonies and the slave trade that was so connected to them, did play a vital 
role in Metropolism, which will be explored in the next chapter ÔColonies and the 
Slave TradeÕ. 
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VII 
Colonies and the Slave Trade 
Colonies comprise another major facet of MetropolismÕs foreign trade system. As 
established in Chapter III, the interest of the Ômother countryÕ or Metropole is the 
absolute priority of all the trade networks and colonies serve to facilitate its 
prosperity.
248
 They were supposed to Ômake their interest subservientÕ to that of the 
Metropole and Ôought never to forget what they owe to their mother countryÕ.
249
 This 
paternal attitude persists throughout PostlethwaytÕs work, signifying the dependent 
relationship colonies were to have with the Metropole.  
 
 Under Metropolism, colonies played a clearly defined role: 
to procure the mother country: a greater consumption of the productions of her 
landsÉ occupation for a greater number of the manufacturers, artizans [sic], 
fishermen and seamenÉ a greater quantity of such commodities as she 
wantsÉ a greater superfluity wherewith to supply other people.
250
 
 Colonies contributed towards the objectives of the domestic economy. There was 
nothing radical about this role. They were to function in the standard colonial manner, 
which usually entailed goods from plantations and other raw materials being supplied 
to Britain to be manufactured and consumed or re-exported. This would be facilitated 
by navigation - beneficial in of itself to the MetropoleÕs economy - to enable their 
Ôcoasting tradeÕ, providing Ôgreater communication between every partÕ and with this 
better information, Ôgreater rivalshipÕ. This is astute, as larger Ôlong distance transport 
networksÕ could allow entrepreneurial merchants to scale their businesses to meet this 
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larger market, as well as allowing ÔinformationÉ to be synthesised from widely 
dispersed locationsÕ, improving the potential for effective decision-making and 
reducing potential risk. Navigation would also allow for greater intra-colonial trade, 
fostering a stronger colonial network, and lastly it would allow trade with rivals. This 
was acceptable on the condition that it was not required or Ônot admittedÕ by the 
Metropole.
251
 
 
 The successful function of a colony was to be guaranteed through strict regulation. 
Though Postlethwayt does not specify the precise nature of the regulation, the 
principles were that any Ôcolony incapable of producing any other commodities than 
those produced by itÕs mother countryÕ would be Ômore dangerous than usefulÕ and 
should be abandoned, for it provided too great a threat to the trade of the Metropole. 
Additionally, colonies should not Ôconsume foreign commodities with an equivalent 
for which the mother country consents to supply themÕ: they should function as 
consumers of British goods, thereby contributing further to a positive balance of 
trade. 
252
  
 
 Postlethwayt wrote of the Ômutual dependency that subsists betweenÕ the ÔAfrican 
and America tradeÕ and was envious of the French colonies, believing their success at 
the time was largely due to their Ôuniform constitutionÕ where Ôevery part cooperates 
for the general safety and preservation of the wholeÕ.
253
 Just as Metropolism 
demanded greater proactivity in its foreign diplomacy, so did it in its management of 
its colonies. BritainÔs regulation had been inconsistent: purportedly lax regulation of 
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its ÔIndian affairsÕ had Ôlost the alliance and attachment of those peopleÕ and the 
variance in the Ôconstitution of our several colonies in North AmericaÕ ÔendangeredÕ 
their Ôsecurity.
254
 Metropolism demanded strict enforcement of regulation: if traders 
in the colonies were to export goods needed in Britain, Ôor if the returnsÕ were not 
Ômoney, cattle or commodities of which the mother country is in wantÕ then the Ôcrew 
ought to be punishedÕ; to be made example of.
255
 In this system it was the role of the 
state, the Ôbody politicÕ to ensure that trade was conducted Ôaccording as the welfare 
of the state requiresÕ and hence Ôall coloniesÕ were to be Ôunder a state of perpetual 
prohibitionÕ.
256
 
 
It was therefore necessary through the legislature to better unify the regulation of this 
system of trade to protect against international rivals. Rejection of existing regulations 
in favour of a rigorous, more enforceable set of legislation was prescient. In the latter 
half of the 18th-century there was a growing recognition amongst select politicians 
that the old mercantile legislation was creaking and new legislation was required to 
better ÔmaximiseÕ colonial ÔrevenuesÕ.
257
 This has been corroborated by John Miller 
who studied ineffectually-enforced American legislation.
258
 Attempts to rectify this 
took many forms, though the Stamp Acts and the Townshend Acts are the widest 
known. These sought to implement Ôrevived orthodox mercantilismÕ by more 
effectively monetizing colonial trades, particularly the sugar trade.
259
 Although these 
acts were passed after PostlethwaytÕs career was over, but they do demonstrate the 
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broad idea of what he desired. This kind of consistent regulation would enable the 
entire system to function better and facilitate greater success for the Metropole 
through greater control and enforcement of trade.  
 
Such ideas opposed contraband and smuggling, for they circumvented taxation and 
denied local and national government income. It was of particular concern for 
Postlethwayt whose early career in the service of Robert Walpole involved the 
introduction of an excise tax, which caused political ÔcontroversyÕ. During his 
evaluation of French regulation, Postlethwayt described the French aggression 
towards foreign goods and contraband; a view he generally admired. Under orders 
from the French King, Ôall officers and captainsÕ of ships were to Ôseize all vessels, 
barks and othersÕ be they ÔFrenchÕ or ÔforeignÕ that carried Ôcontraband commerceÕ 
with their Ôcolonies in AmericaÕ and to forcibly extricate both the goods and the 
smugglers. Incentives were provided to anyone - even foreigners - to ÔreduceÉ by 
forceÕ those who carried contraband and once seized, the ÔprizesÕ were to be 
categorised and regulated. The proceeds from these ÔprizesÕ were then to be ÔdividedÕ 
between the ÔadmiralÕ, the shipÕs commander, the local governor, the sailors and to 
Ôthe commissioners of the treasury of the marine, for the maintenance of the coloniesÕ. 
This is a clever scheme by the French that incentivised the reporting and capture of 
smuggled goods while still funding the local government infrastructure as would 
typically occur through duties.
260 
 
 Postlethwayt would have been particularly enthused by this approach because 
contraband and smuggling could be so damaging towards metropolism. Smuggled 
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foreign goods could undercut the prices of British/colonial goods through avoiding 
import duties, which reduced the profits to be made by domestic manufacturers and 
damaged the British balance of trade.
261
 Even smuggling from within the British 
system of trade undermined British business, hence why Postlethwayt pragmatically 
calls for the Ôlessening, as soon as the circumstances of public affairs will admit of it 
the taxes upon all those articles, which contribute to render our commodities dear to 
foreign nationsÕ.
262
 Here he did not exclusively write of export/import duties, though 
they surely apply. This is bolstered by PostlethwaytÕs other writing about Ôfree portsÕ 
where Ôthe importation of whatever it is advantageous to re-export is allowed free of 
dutyÕ, which encourages the import of raw materials to be manufactured and the 
subsequent re-exportation.
263
 Contraband would have undermined this system - 
smuggled foreign goods would have escaped duty and be potentially more price 
competitive than Metropolitan goods whilst not employing the domestic population. It 
would also disincentivise smuggling of goods that could be manufactured in the 
Metropole and then re-exported for profits therein because there was no value taking 
the risk. Due to the structural changes in British exports, with inter-imperial trade 
between the Metropolis and the colonies becoming proportionally more valuable, the 
potential losses from smuggling were even greater.
264
 
 However, any regulation is worthless if is not adhered to. The physical distance from 
the Metropole and the lag-time resulting from the limited speed of information 
transmission between these regions meant it was difficult to ensure the policies were 
enacted in the colonies. Colonial merchants and governors, especially in the West 
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Indies, had frequently flaunted regulations in favour of personal gain or the needs of 
their colony.
265
 In Massachusetts, wider strategic concerns from the French and Dutch 
navies meant that the Metropole government had little power but to Ôwrite instructions 
and exhort the colonial magistratesÕ if their regulation was not followed.
266
 
Postlethwayt demonstrated his knowledge by complaining that regions Ôin the 
Massachusetts BayÕ were not obliged to  Ôreturn authentic copies of their lawsÕ and 
that some had passed laws using loopholes that enabled them to escape the scrutiny of 
the Metropole and Ôour Board of TradeÕ.
267
 Under Metropolism, colonies require 
Ôgood disciplineÕ and must be Ôstrictly made to observe the fundamental laws of their 
original countryÕ in order to Ôbecome a strength for their mother countryÕ and 
ominously Postlethwayt warned that the failure to ensure this could lead to these 
colonies being Ôwrested from a nation, to be turned against itÕ.
268
  
Curiously, Postlethwayt demanded a very different approach for Ireland. Under 
Metropolism there would be a Ôcomplete union between Great Britain and IrelandÕ, an 
idea which was innovative and ahead of its time. Unlike other colonies, Ireland would 
be allowed to compete with British manufactures and produce goods cheaply. 
IrelandÕs capability to do this was so great that it was Ôcapable of competing with and 
underselling even FranceÕ. On paper, this competition would harm British trade in 
competing markets, costing them and contravening the core objective of always 
improving the MetropoleÕs balance of trade. However this loss of trade would be 
compensated by a subsidy that Ireland would have to pay to be part of this ÔunionÕ. 
This subsidy then allowed British taxation to be reduced in equivalent value, 
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increasing the competitiveness of its ÔcommoditiesÕ that were at the time Ôincapable of 
maintaining a rivalship against France and othersÕ. As this union developed, Irish 
lands would be more actively cultivated to increase their potential output and the 
amount of subsidy paid, gradually allowing British goods to be more competitive in 
foreign markets. Essentially the short-term detriment to British producers is 
counterbalanced by the increasing competitiveness provided by the revenue from Irish 
producers. Postlethwayt stressed throughout his work that a nation must maximise its 
trade or lose out to its rivals. This union was a creative way of achieving this while 
more effectively protecting the high quality Irish ÔfabricsÕ.
269
  
Not only would this stimulate domestic manufactures in the long term, but it would 
have a strategic value in foreign trade. According to Postlethwayt, EnglandÕs woollen 
trade had been crippled by its excessive taxation and had lost out to the more 
competitive Dutch and French. IrelandÕs high quality produce and low costs would, 
with the protection, be able to achieve dominance in the European markets in a way 
that could not be achieved if forced to be first exported to Britain. This would deprive 
rivals of income, Ôtill England shall be able to work as cheap as the IrishÕ.
270
 
 This union with Ireland would also require a reconfiguration of navigation and trade 
laws regarding Ireland. Metropolism would open Ôthe plantation trade freelyÕ to 
Ireland by reversing existing laws that meant such goods were Ôobliged to enter and 
landÕ in England prior to arriving in Ireland. This regulation was an obviously 
inefficient process and Postlethwayt claims that these illogical regulations prompted 
Irish traders to sail directly to the French ports, and Ôfurnish themselves with their 
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brandies and sugar without daring to meddle with those of our own coloniesÕ. This is 
doubly bad for Britain Ð British colonies lose business from the Irish and their 
European rivals gain by selling to the Irish and in the transaction receiving Irish goods 
that could Ôundersell the EnglishÕ. Therefore to reverse such arbitrary limitations 
could only be beneficial. Metropolism was not doctrinaire on regulation; it considered 
the practical effects and outcomes and encourages the reduction of regulation when 
they impede trade, as was the case with Ireland. At its core, Metropolism was a 
pragmatic set of policies.
271
  
The tacit practice of MetropolismÕs system that underpinned a successful nation was 
the slave trade. Postlethwayt argued that the African Trade contributed enormously to 
the British economy by providing a Ôconsiderable national balance in our favourÕ, 
going so far as to claim that it was the Ômost nationally beneficialÕ of all major trade 
routes.
272
 There is some validity to this: the cheap and numerous labour of slaves 
purchased from Africa allowed for the production or extraction of raw materials such 
as molasses or tobacco in monocultural regions like Virginia, Barbados or 
Martinique.
273
 These could then be exported at low costs to the Metropole for 
refinement or manufacture.  These Ôslave grown productsÕ also stimulated 
consumerism, which was beneficial to British trade.
274
 This process was ingrained 
into the colonial structure by the time Postlethwayt began his career and he made no 
propositions that would change this reliance on colonial slave labour.
275
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Eric Williams used PostlethwaytÕs publications as a key source for his treatise on the 
economic motivations behind the slave trade, dismissing Wylie SypherÕs claim that 
Postlethwayt held a Ôdark viewÕ towards the slave trade.
276
 This seems reasonable as 
Postlethwayt did not celebrate the extreme treatment towards slaves, taking a 
surprisingly enlightened view towards race: 
yet we well know, that nature is one and the same in all parts of the world, 
suitable to its climate and itÕs situation; and the colour, and stature in men is as 
little to be despised as the soil where they inhabit, and the productions of the 
earth: and soils of all kinds and in all climes are improvable; and why not the 
human nature? Are not the rational faculties of the negroe [sic] people in the 
general equal to those of any other of the human species? And experience has 
shown that they are no less capable of the mechanical and manufactural [sic] 
arts and trades than the bulk of the EuropeansÉ For my own part I cannot 
help expressing my dislike to the slave trade, and wish an end could be put to 
it.
277
 
Despite this viewpoint, Postlethwayt willingly advocated a system that prolonged the 
slave trade; worked for a slave-trading company and published on their behalf to try 
and get them the exclusive slave trade contract, the Assiento.
278
 In this regard, 
WilliamsÕ general criticism of Postlethwayt is justified, however in the details it is 
less so. 
Williams criticized Postlethwayt for disparaging Ôwhite laborers [sic] in the coloniesÕ 
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as they would Ôcreate rivalry with the mother country in manufacturingÕ.
279
 This 
doesnÕt seem accurate: throughout his work, Postlethwayt promoted employment, be 
it as a merchant, manufacturer or an agriculturalist.
280
 He even argued for the 
attraction of skilled foreign workers where necessary.
281
 A more accurate description 
of his view is that the African slaves perform functions that only African slaves could 
do in his mind Ð they were just a natural part of the system that he Ôwas inclined to 
believeÕ could be changed Ôwithout injury to our plantationsÕ but offered no practical 
suggestion as to how.
282
  
 With the exception of the earlier example, African slaves are written of in purely 
economical term. Postlethwayt complained of potentially having a Ôdependence for 
themÕ in the same manner as he does for other raw materials and he wrote 
possessively of Ôour choicest negroesÕ, amongst countless casual examples.
283
 It is 
true that Metropolism sought to minimise competition between the colonies and the 
Metropole but this is about protecting British workers and it is also likely that slaves 
would provide labour cheaper than Europeans. In PostlethwaytÕs view the African 
trade, in other words the slave trade, was the Ômost nationally beneficialÕ of all major 
foreign trades. This was logical as it ensured the cheapest colonial agriculture and 
production, so vital to the MetropoleÕs domestic employment and exports, providing 
Ôa considerable national balance in our favourÕ.
284
 
 However, this celebration of the African trade was published in 1746, either one or 
two years after PostlethwaytÕs election to the ÔCourt of AssistantsÕ for the Royal 
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African Company.
285
 It is little surprise that the previously mentioned humanitarian 
view towards slaves and the potential replacement of the slave-trade networks came 
in 1757, well after the Royal African Company was dissolved and after his 
involvement in the slave trade was ended.
286
 This publication Ð and the two slave 
trade oriented documents that followed it Ð were persuasive in nature: trying to lobby 
Parliament and Prime Minister Henry Pelham for  Ô£30,000Õ to ease the ailing 
companyÕs loans.
287
 This is obvious lobbying by Postlethwayt on behalf of his 
employer. Despite this, his discussion of the slave trade goes beyond a sole concern 
with the Royal African Company, with his final publication on the subject being 
published in 1758, after its demise. It is likely to be as Bennett claims, that Ôhis 
involvement informed his publishingÕ rather than directly funding or motivating it.
288
 
In his final publication on the slave trade, Postlethwayt even mentioned that he Ôhad a 
share in the direction of the African CompanyÕ, a concession likely made to show his 
knowledge on the subject, though it was absent in the prior articles.
289
 It is quite 
possible that the recipients of these first two publications were aware of his position 
on the companyÕs court of assistants and therefore it did not need to be stated, a likely 
outcome given his closeness with leading politicians.
290
 Nevertheless, PostlethwaytÕs 
involvement with the Royal African Company is an important factor to consider. 
 Many of PostlethwaytÕs arguments about the unjust treatment of the company were 
not incongruous with his wider opinions.  Through his discussions on the slave trade 
he argued for the necessity of a monopoly trading company to counteract the 
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persistent efforts Ôby rivals to exclude BritainÕ from the African trade.
291
 This is the 
exact argument he made in support of select monopolies for managing long distance 
trade: that small traders cannot compete with foreign joint-stock companies.
292
 He 
criticised those Ôwho clamour against monopolies in order to break privilegesÕ, which 
had led to the removal of the companyÕs exclusive monopoly in 1698.
293
 Despite the 
Company having paid Ôthe immense cost of establishing forts and settlements to 
defend the country against the sinister and undermining designs of other European 
competitorsÕ, the monopoly had been removed, an injustice which prompted 
Postlethwayt to question, Ôis it not the policy of all trading nations in Europe to grant 
the first adventurers such privileges, immunities and encouragements?Õ.
294
 This too, 
was congruous with MetropolismÕs promotion of Ômitigated patentsÕ that rewarded 
innovation but for short-term periods.
295
 The Company had been ÔinefficientÕ through 
its operation but also beset by governmental misuse, with its charter being eroded in 
four uneven phases, so PostlethwaytÕs argument was not without merit.
296
 
 This monopoly was to be empowered by ensuring the South Sea Company was able 
to secure the Assiento contract. The Assiento, an exclusive contract to supply the 
Spanish empire with slaves, would not be ÔinjuriousÕ to England Ôbut Ôit is certainly 
highly so to the Trading subjects of FranceÕ. Postlethwayt defended this monopoly in 
typical fashion: ÔThat the Assiento is a monopoly in this sense is true: but a British 
monopoly that excludes foreign nations from trade can never be thought detrimental 
to British subjects in generalÕ. It would also secure the Ôsupply of negroes to 
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American plantationsÕ, so vital to the MetropoleÕs commerce. This would force 
Britain into Ôcontracting with some other nation who could supply themÕ, thereby 
weakening BritainÕs balance of trade and strengthening that of the rival. Once more 
these ideas were congruent with his wider suggestions for Metropolism, emphasis that 
Postlethwayt did not contort his views to suit his employer the Royal African 
Company.
297
 
 Similarly, his proposal for securing the Royal African CompanyÕs finances by 
restructuring their debt with annuities, bore Ôconsiderable symmetryÕ to wider 
suggestions on the national debt and to the Ô1749 Debt ActÕ, which Bennett claims 
Postlethwayt had defended on behalf of Prime Minister Henry Pelham.
298
 
 
 Postlethwayt even argued that the Assiento contract Ôimpowers the assientifs to 
import so many hundred tons of British manufactures into the Spanish indies beside 
NegroesÕ; increasing British exports to foreign markets and contributing to a positive 
balance of trade. This seems misguided, as the Assiento had not proven commercially 
successful in of itself. Its true value came from the Ôincredible profits from the 
contraband tradeÕ carried alongside its operation, with these profits Ôdistributed 
throughout the whole English nationÕ, though pointedly not into Treasury coffers.
299
 
 In a later publication on the African Trade, Postlethwayt called for an urgent Ôfull 
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maritime expeditionÕ to Ôstrike at the root of the commerce of the French sugar 
colonies in AfricaÕ.
300
 By this time the Royal African Company had been dissolved 
and replaced, leaving Postlethwayt with no employment in the slave trade. This 
advocacy for a military element to trade fits entirely with his views on how major 
foreign trade could be seized from rivals and there is logic to this behaviour.
301
 
Whether it was appropriate for the slave trade in particular is much harder to discern. 
This militaristic approach continued when he wrote of the need to pay for (and 
continue development of) the companyÕs forts that lined the West African coast.
302
 In 
PostlethwaytÕs view, these Ôforts and settlementsÕ, which came at an Ôimmense costÕ, 
were necessary in Africa to Ôdefend the country against the sinister and undermining 
designs of other European competitorsÕ.
303
 
 There is no doubt that the Royal African Company had fronted the costs for the 
establishment of these forts, but the historiography shows that the expressed use of 
these forts is slightly misleading. Forts were used mostly as temporary holdings for 
slaves prior to transportation, a role they were not designed for, rather than defence.
304
 
The slave trade was increasingly carried out on ships. In the Bight of Biafra it was 
Ôconducted from ships exclusivelyÕ and in the Ôhundred years or so after 1740Õ 
became a Ômajor supplier of slaves to the AmericasÕ.
305
 Forts remained in use but 
ship-based approaches were of greater importance than Postlethwayt gave them. His 
knowledge of the practice of the slave trade appears limited, likely due to a lack of 
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direct experience in the industry. 
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VIII 
Conclusion 
 
 Metropolism was a curious mix of progressive and conventional ideas. Postlethwayt 
had progressed beyond the earlier bullionist concerns, though remained devoted to 
pursuing a positive balance of trade through a subservient colonial structure that 
utilised slave labour and monopoly trading companies. This was combined with the 
liberal concept of pursuing as unregulated a trade as was practicable to maximise the 
balance of trade at all costs. However in many foreign routes of trade what he 
perceived as feasible were the use of monopoly trading companies. Despite the 
criticisms of these monopoly companies, Postlethwayt was to be proven somewhat 
correct. If properly managed they could still perform a function for Britain, as the 
successful transition of the East India Company demonstrates.
306
 Postlethwayt was 
innovative in many of his approaches, particularly national debt, union with Ireland 
and his measured attitude to free trade.
307
 However this is hindered by his early-
imperial view of colonies as merely subservient and his limited approach to a more 
active British empire. 
 
Throughout Malachy PostlethwaytÕs career, the structures of the economy that had 
been the foundation for mercantilism were shifting in form and function. Metropolism 
looked to fortify colonies as supplicant regions that would supply the exotic goods 
that could be refined in Britain (aiding employment) and then re-exported in the 
lucrative European markets. This was and continued to be a prosperous enterprise in 
the eighteenth-century, which Metropolism correctly promoted. However it placed far 
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less emphasis on the increasingly bilateral nature of trade between Britain and its 
colonies, largely comprising of woollen goods or naval stores. 
  
 Colonies were increasingly being valued Ôas consumersÕ not just Ôproducers of their 
own native goods to be imported to EnglandÕ; contravening Ôone of the basic tenets of 
mercantilismÕ: Ôeconomic self-sufficiencyÕ, and forcing a shift of emphasis from Ôself-
supporting countryÕ to Ôself-supporting empireÕ.
308
 This arose as the colonial-
Metropole relationship grew tenser and Metropole politicians sought to improve the 
Ôadministrative apparatus to controlÕ and manage the colonies.
309
Bostonians 
increasingly rejected British anti-smuggling legislation as it impeded their means to 
survive.
310
 Similar anti-smuggling legislation in the West Indies (policies that broadly 
align with the principles of Metropolism) was resisted because smuggled goods 
played a vital role in their ability to withstand crises.
311
 There was an increasing 
Ôcolonial regionalismÕ as opposed to pure loyalty to the Metropole.
312
 The causes of 
this growing sense of separation vary, depending on the location, but amongst select 
groups there was a sustained rejection of British attempts to better corral the colonies. 
This most obviously manifested in the American colonies, which erupted into 
revolution. 
     
MetropolismÕs demand for colonial ÔsubservienceÕ reflect the failed attempts at 
colonial legislation that fostered this discontent, though his proposals generally pre-
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date this movement, again demonstrating his firm position within the political milieu 
of his time.
313
 While PostlethwaytÕs proposal was protectionist, he called for lower 
rates but better enforcement on colonial and domestic taxation. This was because he 
felt that the more tax imposed on British goods, the less price competitive they 
became and therefore less likely to be consumed by foreign markets. This was an 
awful outcome because the Ôone thingÕ that can provide a nationÕs Ôsuperiority over 
anotherÕ was through the Ôforeign consumption of its manufacturesÕ, which was 
weakened by excessive taxation. Instead it was better to have lower duties, which 
created potential for more wealth in the nation, which was preferable as Ôfortunes 
divided among many are a much greater help to the circulation and real riches of a 
countryÕ. In this regard, he resembles the approach of the Grenvillian acts that sought 
to impose regulation that was better enforced but at lower rates.
314
 
  
On one hand Postlethwayt adopted ÔWhig Libertarian ideasÕ by trying to keep prices 
as competitive as possible through minimised regulation, whilst he also shared the 
ideas that superceded this position - Ôauthoritarian conservative nationalismÕ, shown 
mainly through his desire for a military-trading interest.
315
 Postlethwayt and his 
Metropolism failed to recognise the changing nature of the colonial structure. He was 
not oblivious to such changes Ð his proposals for Ireland represent a minor effort for 
closer imperial integration Ð but too much focus is devoted to improving and 
sustaining the Metropole as opposed to developing colonial trading communities.
316
 
Due to this opinion, his ruthless drive for a positive balance of trade, the endorsement 
of frequently strict trade regulations and the celebration of traders as the Ômost useful 
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member in the societyÕ, Metropolism should be considered a sub-category of 
mercantilism.
317
 As was demonstrated in Chapter II, the concept of mercantilism is 
loose, scattered between different countries, different time-periods and differing 
opinions.
318
 Metropolism can be considered a late-era mercantilist off-shoot rather 
than the imperial writers and free-trade liberals that emerged in the late-eighteenth 
and early-nineteenth century. 
 
 PostlethwaytÕs work is less prone to the supposed-problems of reliability that other 
mercantilists are claimed to have, though his work is not without issues.
319
 It is clear 
that his role as a political writer - perhaps Ôspin doctorÕ - coloured his writing.
320
 The 
persistent use of rhetorical questions demonstrates this.
321
 His publications and letters 
are littered with grovelling forewords to employers and potential employers.
322
 
Similarly, as he explored the comments of foreign politicians he Ôomitted several 
more severe reflections on the British ministersÕ, apparently because it did not 
Ôanswer my purpose of unanimity and concord in this nationÕ.
323
 While there likely is 
some truth to this omission - such comments may distract from the overall 
suggestions Ð it does also show that Postlethwayt self-censored as he was mindful of 
his audience. This does not discredit him as a source Ð like many he was bound by 
financial necessity Ð but it is important to differentiate between the flattery and the 
intellectual content. 
                                            
317
 Postlethwayt, Great BritainÕs True System, pp. 21-22. 
318
 See pp. 11-23. 
319
 See pp. 17-22 for reliability of mercantilist writers. 
320
 Bennett, ÔMalachy PostlethwaytÕ, passim. 
321
 See, Ôis it notÕ p. 46; Postlethwayt, BritainÕs Commercial Interest: Volume II, pp. 243-244, ÔHas this 
not the experience of the African Trade proved the truth of this beyond doubt?Õ. 
322
 Postlethwayt, Universal Dictionary of Trade, Volume 1, pp. i-iii, was addressed to the Lord Mayor 
of LondonÕ; Postlethwayt, BritainÕs Commercial Interest: Volume I, p. i., was addressed to the Marquis 
of Granby; Appendix 4 p. 90, he signs his letters with variations of Ôwith the utmost zeal and fidelity, 
your honourÕs most humble, obedient and devoted servantÕ. 
323
 Postlethwayt, BritainÕs Commercial Interest: Volume II, p. 430. 
 85 
 
Other conflicts of interest, such as PostlethwaytÕs involvement with the Royal African 
Company, reveal him to be a consistent source Ð he did advocate on their behalf but 
did not change his opinions to do so.
324
 Whether Postlethwyat truly believed his 
published ideas and was hired by politicians because he held these views or whether 
he wrote such ideas to appeal to potential employers is irrelevant. His early work for 
Robert Walpole established his positions Ð creating enemies and allies in the 
process.
325
 He could not - and did not Ð credibly alter his general view on commercial 
affairs, which validates his publications as a largely consistent and coherent body of 
work. 
 
 It is possible that historians have misjudged the intentions of mercantilist writers and 
Postlethwayt is just one part of this.
326
 Alternatively Postlethwayt may have been one 
of the exceptions. Or it could be that as global trade systems matured, so did the 
writers on the political economy. For a fairer representation of mercantilism it is 
necessary to return to the original writers, as has been done here with Postlethwayt, 
and re-evaluate their work. 
 
 This would allow for a refresh on the historiography incorporating modern 
historiographical additions. This is the most effective way to avoid the many 
problems that blight a historiography where the central, guiding document for 
mercantilismÕs articulation is the Wealth of Nations, a book consciously critical of the 
practices of mercantilism. A re-evaluation of the original writers would also allow for 
the introduction of more rigorous terminology to differentiate mercantilist ideas, 
                                            
324
 See pp. 75-80, for discussion on PostlethwaytÕs involvement with the Royal African Company. 
325
 Bennett, ÔMalachy PostlethwaytÕ, p. 188. 
326
 See pp. 17-22 for reliability of mercantilist writers. 
 86 
which at present share the same terminology yet involve different countries and 
different periodisations.
327
 Metropolism is just one of potentially many sub-genres for 
mercantilism, representing the mid-to-late eighteenth century views of the political 
economist Malachy Postlethwayt. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 
Images of the Slave Trade sponsored by the Virginia Foundation for the Humanities 
and the University of Virginia Library:  
ÔCape Coast Castle, Gold CoastÕ, D003, Images of the Slave Trade sponsored 
by the Virginia Foundation: 
http://hitchcock.itc.virginia.edu/Slavery/details.php?categorynum=4&category
Name=European%20Forts%20and%20Trading%20Posts%20in%20Africa&th
eRecord=10&recordCount=56 Last Accessed: 23-09-13.  
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Appendix 2: 
 
P. Deane and W. A. Cole, British Economic Growth, 1688-1959: Trends and 
Structures (London, 1967), p. 87. 
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Appendix 3: 
 
P. Deane and W. A. Cole, British Economic Growth, 1688-1959: Trends and 
Structures (London, 1967), p. 87. 
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Appendix 4: 
 
Cholmondeley Ch(H), Correspondence 1, Cambridge University Library, 2202: 
Malachy Postlethwayt to Robert Walpole, 10 June 1734. 
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